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Articles
The Intellectual Origins of (Modem)
Substantive Due Process
Joshua D. Hawley*
Almost fifty years after the Supreme Court revived the doctrine,
substantive due process remains a puzzle. Detractors insist it is nothing more
than judicial policy making. Defenders say it accords with the deepest values
of the Constitution. But on all sides, the present scholarly debate suffers from
an impoverished understanding of modern substantive due process's
intellectual history, which has led to an impoverished understanding of the
doctrine's core normative content. It is time for a revisionist turn. This
Article supplies that turn by excavating the intellectual origins of modern
substantive due process and relating that history to the doctrine's
development. Ultimately, the Article offers a thoroughly revised account of
the modern doctrine's beginnings, development, and meaning. The core of
the story is this: modern substantive due process depends on a coherent and
thoroughly modern notion of liberty, grounded in the ideas- of personal
authenticity and self-development. The modern doctrine's history begins in
the Lochner era, but its debt to Lochner is not the one critics usually claim.
Rather, modern substantive due process is rooted in the critique of the police
powers jurisprudence developed by the opponents of Lochner. This critique
rejected the central elements of an older view of liberty, including natural
rights and the distinction between the public and private spheres. In the
decades that followed Lochner's demise, liberal theorists connected this
modernist outlook to a venerable ethic of individual authenticity to fashion a
new understanding of human rights and political liberty. This new concept
of liberty emphasized personal moral choice and autonomy' rather than
private property and the right to contract. By the early 1960s, this view of
liberty had achieved widespread support among opinion makers and by the
end of that decade, became the basis for a new reading of due process. The
revised account developed here challenges a good deal of conventional
wisdom, including the claims of the recent Lochner revisionists like David
Bernstein and Randy Barnett who argue that modern substantive due process
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is in one way or another an intellectual extension of the Lochner era. It also
challenges the claims of those, like Jack Balkin, who contend that the modern
doctrine can be linked directly to the Constitution's original meaning.
Instead, this Article shows modern substantive due process for what it is: an
original, modern, and controversial reading of liberty.
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Introduction
Substantive due process remains a puzzle. Nearly fifty years after the
Supreme Court revived the doctrine,' its historical origins and precise
meaning-to say nothing of its relationship to the constitutional text-remain
as obscure as ever. This is not from want of attention on the part of legal
scholars. Over the last five decades, scholars have expended prodigious
efforts theorizing substantive due process and its affiliated cases, with results
that are by now entirely familiar. Detractors insist substantive due process is
sheer invention, a matter of Justices reading their preferred social theories
1. The key sequence of cases is Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
[Vol. 93:275
Intellectual Origins
into the Constitution.2 Defenders claim the doctrine faithfully captures the
Constitution's commitment to privacy and personal autonomy, though
perhaps not for the reasons the Court usually gives.3
This conversation, however, has resolved few of the core puzzles
concerning the doctrine's origins and meaning. Indeed, if it reveals anything,
the protracted scholarly impasse reveals that our understanding of substantive
due process is due for a revisionist turn. This Article is an effort to make that
turn, to set aside the predictable, competing accounts of substantive due
process-which often turn out to be mythologies upon closer inspection, as
we shall see 4 -and recover the doctrine's core content and meaning. I
propose to do that by uncovering the doctrine's intellectual origins, which is
to say, by reconstructing its intellectual history.5 This is a project few if any
2. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 273-74 (2d ed. 1997) (criticizing courts for substituting their own
views of policy for those of legislatures); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31-32 (1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court for inventing
"substantive" due process); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV.
85, 125 (concluding that the Supreme Court bases its due process judgments on the Justices' policy
views); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
103 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 897 (2009) (arguing that modem substantive due process depends on the
"subjective, shifting judgment" of judges). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due
Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 159 (criticizing the rationale
of Roe v. Wade); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L.
REV. 493 (1997) (presenting and then refuting common arguments for a textual basis of substantive
due process).
3. See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process:
Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 594
(2009) (arguing that the Framers of the Constitution would have understood "due process of law"
to include specific, yet unenumerated rights); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 999 (concluding that the Due Process Clause probably had substantive as
well as procedural components in 1791). See generally Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 850-
59 (1978) (examining the concept of "fundamental law" in English common law); David A.J.
Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1281 (1977) (arguing that the Constitution vouchsafes broad protections for personal
privacy).
4. See infra Part V.
5. That makes this Article a work of constitutional historicism, as ably defined by the recent
work of Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism
and Legal Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173,
181 (2001); Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided": Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 679 (2005). My approach to intellectual history and the history
of ideas has been significantly shaped by the theory and methodology of Quentin Skinner. See e.g.,
QUENTIN SKINNER, 1 THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE RENAISSANCE,
at ix-xv (1978) (describing his approach as a "history of ideologies" and comparing that to a more
traditional textual approach); Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,
8 HIST. & THEORY 3-4 (1969) [hereinafter Skinner, Meaning and Understanding] (critiquing
approaches that analyze "text" or "context" to understand a historical work). See generally
MEANING AND CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS (James Tully ed., 1988) (providing




scholars have attempted,6 and when we pursue it, we find this: that modern
substantive due process depends on a coherent, robust, and thoroughly
modem account of liberty, one that turns on an idea of personal authenticity
and self-development. This notion of liberty has roots deep in the Western
past but is, in the end, distinctly the product of the twentieth century.7 My
aim is to tell the story of this idea's ascendance and how it came to be incor-
porated into constitutional law. Ultimately, I offer a fully revised account of
modern substantive due process's intellectual origins and development, from
the apparent demise of substantive due process at the close of the Lochner
era to its revival in the 1960s.
This revised account challenges a good deal of current thinking, not
least the claims of the recent Lochner revisionist-or perhaps, revivalist-
6. Though the literature on substantive due process is vast, I am aware of no legal scholar who
has systematically investigated the intellectual origins of the modem doctrine. To be sure, many
scholars have constructed theories of the doctrine's meaning, including theories as to the appropriate
uses of historical evidence and tradition. E.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due
Process, 85 N.C. L. REV. 63, 66-68 (2006) (discussing two preexisting theories of substantive due
process and arguing for the superiority of a third emerging "theory of evolving national values");
James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 211, 290-97
(1993) (proposing an interpretative theory of "constitutional constructivism" that goes beyond
analyzing only constitutional text or the "intentions of the framers and ratifiers"); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Dumbo's Feather: An Examination and Critique of the Supreme Court's Use,
Misuse, and Abuse of Tradition in Protecting Fundamental Rights, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 923,
998-1007 (2006) (proposing that tradition, determined by analyzing the states' consensus on a law,
can provide an objective limitation on substantive due process); Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court,
2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 8-11 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme Court "defines the substance of constitutional law
in the context of the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors"); Mattei Ion Radu, Incompatible
Theories: Natural Law and Substantive Due Process, 54 VILL. L. REV. 247, 286-89 (2009) (arguing
that judges should consider the "strict text of the Constitution" rather than natural law when making
decisions). But only two scholars have attempted something approaching intellectual history.
G. Edward White has explored the progressive critique of the Lochner doctrine. G. Edward White,
Revisiting Substantive Due Process and Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 125-28
(1997) [hereinafter White, Revisiting Due Process]. And Rogers Smith has written about the
difference between the ideal of autonomy and earlier understandings of liberty. Rogers M. Smith,
The Constitution andAutonomy, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 175, 175-76 (1982). But White does not follow
the story forward, and Smith is not interested in the historical development of the ideas he mentions
nor does he focus on due process. Howard Gillman has offered a brief account of the rise of what
he calls "modem civil liberties jurisprudence." Howard Gillman, Preferred Freedoms: The
Progressive Expansion of State Power and the Rise of Modern Civil Liberties Jurisprudence, 47
POL. RES. Q. 623, 624-26 (1994). This account is focused entirely on doctrine, however, not the
history of ideas, and is in any event highly tendentious.
7. See infra Parts II-III.
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school sponsored by scholars like David Bernstein 8 and Randy Barnett. 9
These scholars want to resurrect Lochner v. New York'0 and the police powers
jurisprudence," or at least rehabilitate its legacy. 12 But the description of the
Supreme Court's modem due process doctrine they offer is seriously
distorted and their interpretation of the Lochner era deeply anachronistic.' 3
They fail to account for the twentieth-century intellectual revolution that
transformed the Court's understanding of liberty and drove the creation of
modem substantive due process. The account I develop here also challenges
the claims of other scholars, like Jack Balkin, who contend that the Court's
abortion jurisprudence can be linked directly to the Constitution's original
meaning. 14 This argument too depends on a dehistoricized reading of modem
due process's origins and development.15
When we attend seriously to the intellectual history of modem
substantive due process, a new and different picture emerges. The modem,
post-Griswold and Roe version of substantive due process does owe a good
deal to the Lochner era, as critics have often charged, but not the debt usually
alleged. Modem substantive due process is not simply an update of
Lochner's doctrine of fundamental rights. 16 The Lochner era police powers
jurisprudence was in fact not a doctrine of fundamental rights at all, and
moreover, the doctrinal shape of modem substantive due process is quite
distinct from its police powers predecessor. Instead, the modem doctrine's
debt to the Lochner era consists partly of the generality-shifting reading of
8. See generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011) [hereinafter BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING
LOCHNER] (reassessing Lochner and the history of the liberty of contract doctrine); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003) [hereinafter Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism]
(critiquing modem interpretations of Lochner and arguing that later substantive due process cases
were in part based on Lochner's fundamental rights analysis).
9. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 253-69, 319-53 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION]; Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Bamett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power].
10. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 263-64, 268-69
(arguing for close judicial scrutiny of government regulations on "liberty").
12. See BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 3, 6-7 (arguing that prevailing
historical accounts of Lochner are inaccurate and fail to appreciate its merits or true significance).
13. See infra subpart V(A).
14. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 292 (2007)
[hereinafter Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning]; see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING
ORIGINALISM 214-16 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM] (arguing the right to an
abortion is rooted in the Constitution's original meaning).
15. See infra subpart V(B).
16. This is contrary to the argument advanced by David Bernstein. See BERNSTEIN,
REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 6 (arguing that much of today's fundamental rights
jurisprudence is traceable to Lochner).
2014]
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the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause that the police powers
jurisprudence legitimized.17  But perhaps more deeply still, modem
substantive due process is indebted to the critique of the police powers
doctrine Lochner helped inspire.
Contemporary due process emerges from that critique, famously
articulated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in dissent in Lochner18 and
taken up by the progressives and legal realists in the years after.19 The
critique sounded in a thoroughly modem intellectual outlook-one rejecting
natural rights, natural law, and the possibility of permanent moral truths.
20
This modernist viewpoint led the opponents of the police powers doctrine to
reject not merely its practical applications but crucially, its view of political
liberty.2 Yet while the Supreme Court ultimately abandoned the Lochner
line of cases in the late 1930s, it never repudiated the notion that the Due
Process Clause empowered the courts to protect "liberty" as a general
matter.22 In time, the very elements of the case against the police powers
doctrine would form the basis of a new account of liberty. In the waning
years of the Lochner period and in the decades that followed, liberal theorists
like John Dewey and Isaiah Berlin would connect modernist moral
skepticism and ethical pragmatism with a venerable ethic of individual
authenticity to fashion a new understanding of human rights and political
freedom. 3 This new concept emphasized personal moral choice rather than
private property, autonomy, and self-development rather than the right to
contract. By the early 1960s, it had achieved widespread consensus among
intellectual opinion makers and would become by the end of that decade the
basis for a new reading of due process.24
As we shall see, this modernist notion of liberty owed relatively little to
the constitutional text, and it stood in considerable tension with earlier
interpretations of constitutional liberty.25 Instead, this interpretation of
liberty was something the Court would bring to the text, not because it was
compelled by tradition or precedent to do so, but because the Justices found
this idea of liberty compelling and its explanatory potential powerful. 6 That
tenuous relationship to the written text in turn helps explain the particular
doctrinal shape modem substantive due process took: the Court would
17. See infra Part I.
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19. See infra subpart I(B).
20. See infra subpart I(B).
21. See infra subpart I(B).
22. See infra Part I1.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra subparts IV(A)-(B).
25. See infra subparts IV(A)-(B).
26. See infra subparts IV(A)-(B).
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conceptualize it as a doctrine of unenumerated rights to be discovered beyond
the written Constitution and derived from the nature of liberty.27
To unfold this story, I begin in Part I with the critique of the police
powers jurisprudence from which the modem doctrine emerges. Part II
explains the Court's reinterpretation of the Due Process Clause as focused on
fundamental rights following its rejection of Lochner, a doctrinal move
initially motivated by the police powers critique and which the Court would
put to new use once armed with a new understanding of liberty. Part III then
turns to analyze the development of the idea of liberty at the center of the
modem due process doctrine, tracing its emergence from the confluence of
the older ethic of authenticity and more contemporary commitments to value
relativism. Part IV shows how this notion of liberty informed the Court's
revival-and reimagining-of substantive due process, beginning with
Griswold v. Connecticut,28 Eisenstadt v. Baird,29 and Roe v. Wade30 and
continuing through Planned Parenthood v. Casey
3
' and Lawrence v. Texas.32
Finally, Part V explores the implications of this revised account of the
modem doctrine's origins and development for the claims of the pro-Lochner
revisionists and the "living originalism" of Jack Balkin.
Substantive due process is the keystone constitutional doctrine for our
era because it sums up and embodies a prevailing interpretation of political
liberty. In the end, the most important question we can ask is just this: Is this
concept of liberty truly compelling? The critical history I offer here is, I
hope, a first step toward an answer.
I. Some Other Beginning's End: The Fall of the Police Powers
Jurisprudence
The story of the modem version of substantive due process begins with
the demise of its predecessor, the police powers doctrine. Even at this
historical remove, after extensive scholarly discussion of both the police
powers jurisprudence and modem substantive due process, the relationship
between the two is widely misunderstood, in no small part because the police
powers doctrine remains widely mischaracterized. Contrary to what many
have claimed,33 that doctrine was not a form of fundamental rights
27. See infra subparts IV(A)-(B).
28. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
29. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
32. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. See, e.g., 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1370-71 (3d ed. 2000)
(arguing that the "ultimate point [ofLochner] was the preservation of some realm as presumptively
beyond the reach of state power"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 140-41
(2008) (connecting the fundamental underlying principle of Lochner with that in Griswold and
beyond); Jack M. Balkin, Judgment of the Court, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 31,
2014]
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jurisprudence. Instead, it functioned as a type of structural restraint on
government regulation, premised on a set of interlocking ideas: that property
was a natural, prepolitical right before any state or society; that government
existed to safeguard such property; and that only limited governmental
interference in the sphere of private life these property rights protected could
ever be justified, and then only if pursued for the general good.34 These
premises generated a robust vision of democratic liberty, at once individ-
ualistic and social, focused on rights but above all on the social space where
rights were exercised. Getting the police powers doctrine right matters
because modern substantive due process owes a good deal to this precursor.
Or more exactly, it owes a good deal to the critique of the police powers
doctrine's vision of liberty.
That critique was offered in its definitive form by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr.35 and premised on a form of positivist skepticism. In
time, this positivism would inform the Supreme Court's watershed rejection
of the police powers line in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish.36 And yet the
Holmesian critique turned out not to be the end of substantive due process
but the predicate for a new beginning.37 Meanwhile, even as he derided the
notion of inherent limits on government power, Justice Holmes held out the
possibility that laws that traduced certain "fundamental principles" might
offend due process of law.38 Those two elements together, positivist skep-
ticism and the possibility of fundamental rights, supplied the grounds for a
new sort of substantive due process. Both emerged from the Holmesian
critique of the old.
A. The Liberty of Police Powers Due Process
If the last three decades of scholarship on the Lochner Court have made
anything clear, it is that the caricature of Lochner-era jurisprudence as a
noxious concoction of laissez-faire economics, Spencerian social darwinism,
37-38 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (asserting that Lochner focused on protecting certain fundamental
rights, albeit the wrong ones); Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 8, at 31-38
(discussing the "fundamental liberties" involved in the Lochner decision).
34. See infra subpart I(A).
35. White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 103-04, 110-13; see G. EDWARD WHITE,
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 133-35 (3d ed.
2007) [hereinafter WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION] (describing Justice Holmes's
opposition to the police powers doctrine); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 323-30 (1993) [hereinafter WHITE, JUSTICE HOLMES]
(discussing opinions by Justice Holmes that laid the groundwork for a critique of the police powers
doctrine); cf G. Edward White, The Canonization of Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and
Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 576, 578-85 (1995) [hereinafter White, Canonization of
Holmes] (discussing how Holmes's early critique of the police powers doctrine made him a
significant figure to progressives and legal realists).
36. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
37. See infra Parts III-IV.
38. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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and John Stuart Mill's night-watchman state bears little connection to
reality.39 The truth is substantially more complicated and more interesting.
The police powers doctrine that informed the decision in Lochner was a
response to the most pressing problem of American constitutional theory:
how to protect the rights of the people against a government the people
controlled.4' The police powers jurisprudence answered that question by
reference to an account of democratic liberty. And here another caricature
must be dispensed with. The vision of liberty at back of the police powers
jurisprudence was not the sharply libertarian individualism even contem-
porary scholars so often assume,41 but instead a form of social liberty. The
aim of the police powers jurisprudence was to protect the private social
sphere where nineteenth-century theory taught that liberty existed.42
39. See, e.g., MARK WARREN BAILEY, GUARDIANS OF THE MORAL ORDER: THE LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT, 1860-1910, at 169-71 (2004) (arguing that the Court's
Lochner jurisprudence was rooted in a well-developed moral philosophy and worldview, not
economic conservatism); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 45-60 (1993) (discussing the police
power judicial precedents that informed the Lochner-era Supreme Court decisions); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 16 (1992) (contending that Lochner-era jurisprudence reflects an effort by the
Supreme Court to create a system of nonpartisan legal reasoning rather than economic
conservatism); MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS, THE LOCHNER COURT, MYTH AND REALITY 92 (2001)
(asserting that the "standard picture ofLochner-era [jurisprudence] bears [little] resemblance to the
real thing"); Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 L. & HIST. REV. 293, 298 (1985) (arguing that the
"laissez-faire constitutionalism" did not derive from "widely adhered-to economic principles" or
"economic privilege," but from being "congruent with a well-established and accepted principle of
American liberty" during the late-nineteenth century); Alan Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism": A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIST. 751, 752 (1967) (arguing that
applying the concept of laissez-faire to constitutionalism, a phenomena that is not strictly economic,
is an oversimplification and ignores the complexity of history); Charles W. McCurdy, Justice Field
and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire
Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 J. AM. HIST. 970, 973 (1975) (asserting that Justice Field's
jurisprudence is neither closely aligned with Social Darwinism nor a product of the Gilded Age);
William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in
Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 550-60 (1974) (tracing the influence of
abolitionist thought on judicial reasoning and argumentation); White, Revisiting Due Process, supra
note 6, at 107-10 (arguing that the negative association between Lochner-era cases and laissez-faire
economics resulted from an "oversimplification" of Justice Holmes's critique of police power
jurisprudence). See generally William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the
Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 WiS. L. REV. 767 (limning the intellectual influence of the free labor
movement on the development of the police powers doctrine).
40. For a discussion of this problem's origin and significance, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 403-13 (1998) and Gordon S. Wood, The
Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1434-35 (1999) [hereinafler
Wood, Origins of Vested Rights].
41. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 53-63
(discussing natural rights derived from the Constitution as "liberty rights").
42. See HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 10-11 (summarizing the nineteenth-century thinking of an
independent realm of private law made up of private transactions between private individuals that
ought to be free from the dangers of state interference); White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6,
Texas Law Review
The doctrine's account of liberty animated and helped legitimize a
particular reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, one
that found in the text a general principle of liberty and a mandate for courts
to defend it.43 This is the sense in which the police powers jurisprudence was
a form of substantive due process. The label itself is anachronistic; the
Supreme Court would not begin to speak of "substantive" as opposed to
"procedural" aspects of due process until the 1940s.44 But to the extent the
police powers doctrine involved courts in reviewing the substantive
reasonableness of legislation in order to protect a general value of liberty, all
in the name of due process of law, the doctrine gave the Due Process Clause
substantive content.
The basic rules of the police powers doctrine were firmly in place by the
time of Lochner v. New York.45 As that case described them: "The right to
purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by [the Fourteenth]
[A]mendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the right., 46 As
to those circumstances, the state was forbidden from interfering with the
general right to labor and contract unless regulation was necessary "to the
safety, health, morals [or] general welfare of the public., 47 Governmental
regulation was permissible, then, but only in certain circumstances; it was to
be the exception, not the rule. State interference with the private realm had
to be justified by a truly public need, and it had to benefit the public as a
whole.48
The working language of the doctrine gives a telling clue as to the vision
of liberty it endorsed. From the time it was first suggested by judge and
treatise-writer Thomas Cooley in the 1860s to the Supreme Court's rehearsal
of it in Lochner, the doctrinal formula of police powers invariably referred to
at 106 (noting that the doctrine of "liberty of contract" in the police powers cases served to maintain
a private sphere outside the realm of state regulation).
43. See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
44. White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 107-10.
45. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. That last criterion-that legislation benefit the public as a whole-reflected the influence
of a long anticlass tradition in American politics that originated in the revolutionary ideal that
government power in a democracy ought always to be used for the public good, not for the benefit
of private interests or parties. See Wood, Origins of Vested Rights, supra note 40, at 1432(explaining the early American conviction that the new republic should not permit "exploit[ation]
of the public's authority for private gain"). In the 1820s and 1830s, the Jacksonian movement gave
this principle a new reading, arguing that no law should benefit any one class over another. See
GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 47-49 (chronicling the reciprocal relationship between the Jacksonians'
opposition to "class legislation" and judicial decisions demanding legislation further the "general
welfare" only); HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 23-24 (explaining Jacksonian anticlass ideology). For
a useful summary of the anticlass principle, see generally White, Revisiting Due Process, supra
note 6, at 91-100.
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government action as government interference.49  Cooley spoke of
interference with the individual's property;5 ° the Supreme Court in Mugler v.
Kansas5 in 1887 of interference with vested rights; 52 and Lochner v. New
York of interference with the right to labor and make contracts. 3 One
particularly illuminating rehearsal of this theme came in 1893 in the Supreme
Court's opinion in Lawton v. Steele,54 in which the Court referred to any





This consistency was not by chance. Interference was central to the
doctrine of police powers because of the way its proponents pictured the
polity. They saw it as composed of two distinct spheres.56 On the one side
was a realm of private life and activity-the social sphere-and on the other,
government-the sphere of the state. These two spheres had distinct
characters. The private realm was marked by individual choice, private
ordering, and voluntary transactions. 57 The public realm was defined by the
coercive power of the state.5 8 The two could not be assimilated. The basic
aim of the police powers doctrine was to restrain government activity-
"interference"-in the private sphere. 59 The courts usually referred to the
sort of interference the police powers doctrine sought to restrain as
interference with property,60 and that reveals something more: in the late-
nineteenth-century mind, property and the private sphere were indissolubly
linked. More exactly, property generated the private sphere, which was in
turn the home of liberty.
49. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56; see HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 28-30 (indicating that the central
question in cases involving the state's police power was whether government regulation interfered
with the private sphere); Benedict, supra note 39, at 300-05 (distinguishing permitted types of
government interference from prohibited kinds of interference, with the key factor whether the
interference benefitted one group or society as a whole).
50. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 505-08 (7th ed. 1903).
51. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
52. Id. at 659.
53. 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
54. 152U.S. 133 (1894).
55. Id. at 137.
56. McCurdy, supra note 39, at 973; White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 105; see
also HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 10-11 (explaining the distinction between the public and private
realms in nineteenth-century theory).
57. See HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 11 (noting that the private realm was characterized by "non-
coercive and non-political transactions free from... state interference").
58. Id. at 10-11.
59. White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 93-96; see also McCurdy, supra note 39,
at 973-74 (stating that Justice Field's jurisprudence was guided by a quest to determine what role
government should play in the private sphere).
60. For a thorough summary, see James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations of the
Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the State,
31 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 404-37 (1982).
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This link between property and liberty had its origins deep in the Anglo-
American past.61 Property had played a central role in American under-
standings of liberty from the first. Every lettered American of the founding
era knew from John Locke that property was the touchstone of the social
contract; it was to protect their property that individuals left the state of
nature.62 According to Locke, human labor was the source of all wealth in
the world and property was the product of that labor.63 Property was therefore
the key to personal independence, personal advancement, and, by extension,
personal liberty.64 Building on this tradition, James Madison claimed in the
Federalist that persons acquired different amounts of property according to
their diverse "faculties" and that it was "the first object of government" to
protect them in doing so.65
On the Lockean view ubiquitous at the founding, property was a
prepolitical right, a right that belonged to individuals apart from any action
by the state.66 That is, individuals had a right to property by nature. This was
not to say that American constitutionalists believed all property rights
recognized by the law were somehow self-originating. Jurists as early as
John Marshall made quite clear that property rules were creatures of
convention and of the civil law. 67 The point was that individuals had a right
by nature to acquire and hold property, and consequently, they had a right to
a system of legal rules that permitted them to do so. 68  Indeed, it was a
commonplace of treatise writers from the early 1800s forward that the natural
61. See GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 19-33 (proposing that Lochner-era jurists inherited from
the founding period a preference for market liberty and opposition to class legislation). Gillman's
insistence on the continuity of the Founders' concern for property and the later police powers
doctrine is, however, seriously overdrawn. For a corrective view, see ROGERS M. SMITH,
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 75-76 (1985).
62. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 95,
at 348-49 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1964) (1690); accord SMITH, supra note 61, at
22-24 (summarizing Locke's philosophy).
63. LOCKE, supra note 62, §§ 27-32, 40, at 305-38, 314; see also SMITH, supra note 61, at 22
(explaining Locke's belief that the labor of man turns virtual wasteland into profitable property).
64. See SMITH, supra note 61, at 22-23 (stating Locke's view that property is a means to
economic growth and a necessary component of liberty).
65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 73 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
66. See HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 145-50 (examining the development of property rights and
the changing conceptions of property in the late nineteenth century); Robert Brauneis, "The
Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of Justice
Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613, 624-31 (1996) (tracing
the theory of vested rights); Forbath, supra note 39, at 773-79 (asserting that the right of "free
labor," or the rights of individuals to the fruits of their own labor, developed out of the American
conceptions of freedom inherited from the American Revolution).
67. Kainen, supra note 60, at 413-14.
68. See HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 145-50 (discussing the law's transition, in the late
nineteenth century, from a physicalist conception ofproperty to a more abstract and generalized one
focused on market value); Forbath, supra note 39, at 774-75, 778-79 (discussing the importance of
property ownership under the free labor ideology that flourished among Northern Republicans
during the Civil War).
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right to property generated a system of private law that protected individuals
in their work and possessions and generally facilitated their life together.69
"Public wrongs, crimes and punishments, depend on the legislative will for
their existence as such," one early American treatise author, John Milton
Goodenow, explained in 1819.70 But "private rights and private wrongs are
founded in and measured by the immutable principles of natural law and
abstract justice. v71
Early American courts expressed this conviction in the doctrine of
vested rights.72 That doctrine prevented legislative interference with property
rights acquired by an individual under existing law.73 Attempts to alter such
already-vested property interests amounted to a species of retroactive
lawmaking, or so the doctrine held.74 The classic example was offered by
Justice Samuel Chase in 1798 in the case of Calder v. Bull.75 "[A] law that
takes property from A[] and gives it to B," Justice Chase wrote, was arbitrary
and not "a rightful exercise of legislative authority. 76 In 1810, in Fletcher
v. Peck77 the Marshall Court identified this rule as a command of the Article I,
Section 10 Contracts Clause and therefore fully enforceable against the
states.78 In 1819, the Court dramatically expanded the doctrine's reach by
holding that "contracts" included the charter rights of corporations.79
Meanwhile, state courts enforced the vested rights rule as a component of the
"law of the land" or "due process" clauses of state constitutions on the theory
that (following Justice Chase's hint), the rule against undue interference with
property rights was a rule against arbitrary lawmaking.8" Under the rubric of
vested rights, early American courts carved out a private sphere, populated
by private rights and protected by private law, all generated and defined (in
theory, anyway) by the right to property. 81
By the close of the Civil War, prominent legal thinkers had come to read
the prepolitical right to property to include the right to sell one's labor for a
69. See HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 11 (describing the view that property rights themselves
developed and perpetuated a regime of private law).
70. J. M. GOODENOW, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES AND MAXIMS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1819), reprinted in 17 CLASSICS 1N LEGAL HISTORY 37 (Roy M. Mersky & J.
Myron Jacobstein eds., 1972).
71. Id.
72. See Kainen, supra note 60, at 404-25.
73. Id. at 405.
74. Id. at 407-08.
75. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
76. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted).
77. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
78. See id. at 139 (holding that a state may not interfere with vested contract rights via
legislation).
79. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 641, 650 (1819).
80. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408,
464-67 (2010).
81. HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 10-11.
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fair return.82 Thomas Cooley, chief judge of the Michigan Supreme Court
and perhaps the most influential treatise writer of the nineteenth century,
voiced this perspective in his 1868 treatise on the Constitution. Property,
Cooley said, meant more than land or productive assets: property was
anything of value, including a person's labor.83 To deny a person the right to
sell his labor in the market would be to deprive him of "liberty" and his stake
in the "pursuit of happiness., 84
Just five years after Cooley published his Constitutional Limitations,
Justice Stephen Field invoked the same logic in dissent in the Slaughter-
House Cases,85 arguing that if liberty meant anything, it meant the ability "to
pursue the ordinary avocations of life without other restraint than such as
affects all others, and to enjoy equally with them the fruits of [one's] labor. 86
Justice Field cited Adam Smith for the proposition that property necessarily
included the right to contract.87 Field's opinion was controversial because of
his reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, but no Justice disagreed with his
basic description of liberty or with the link between liberty, labor, contract,
and property.88
But counting intangible things with prospective content as property, like
the right to contract, threatened to make the vested rights doctrine
unworkable. If courts treated prospective interests as "vested," the doctrine
would prevent virtually any change in any law touching current or future
property rights. So state courts converted the vested rights framework into a
doctrine prohibiting only unreasonable interference with property rights. As
to what counted as "reasonable," courts looked to the ancient doctrine of
nuisance.89 The common law had long held that the state had the authority
as part of its "police power" to penalize or enjoin uses of private property that
posed a health or safety hazard to the public, including uses that undermined
public morals.90 (Liquor distilleries, for example, were commonly deemed
nuisances under the common law.)91 In the late 1850s, state courts began
fashioning these nuisance categories into an affirmative doctrine of state
82. See Benedict, supra note 39, at 298-305 (explaining the laissez-faire doctrine); Forbath,
supra note 39, at 779-82 (asserting that the freedom to sell one's own labor was at the heart of the
free labor doctrine).
83. COOLEY, supra note 50, at 561; Forbath, supra note 39, at 793-94.
84. COOLEY, supra note 50, at 561.
85. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
86. Id. at 90 (Field, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 110 n.*; see also Forbath, supra note 39, at 779-82 (commenting on Justice Field's
cite to Adam Smith).
88. See GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 65-68 (describing Justice Field's interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the other Justices' understanding of the Amendment's scope).
89. HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 27-29.
90. Id. at 27.




power.92 The state could do more with its police power than abate certain
private uses, the theory went; it could regulate private property prospectively,
so long as that regulation advanced the state's traditional interests in public
health, safety, and morals.93 This was reasonable regulation. Many state
courts had long since characterized the vested rights doctrine as a matter of
"law of the land" or "due process." 94 In the decade preceding the Civil War,
state courts cast their reworking of the vested rights rule into a doctrine of the
police power as a matter of due process too.95 Eventually the Supreme Court
followed suit.
96
The police powers doctrine as it coalesced in the final quarter of the
nineteenth century reflected, in nearly all its particulars, a robust notion of
democratic liberty. Freedom belonged to the private sphere created by the
natural right to property. This right guaranteed its holders the ability to labor,
to sell their labor, to acquire wealth and goods, and to improve their standing
in life. The liberty the police powers doctrine protected was a social liberty
because the natural right to property, though held by individuals, was a social
right. It guaranteed its holders social access. The right to participate in the
market economy, to share in productive labor, to buy and exchange goods-
these were rights that gave their holders a stake in society and its major
projects. 97 All these privileges were in turn protected by a network of private
law, itself generated by and organized around the right to property.98 That
private sphere, that network of law, those social rights of access-this was
the liberty of the police powers doctrine.
The distinctive vision of liberty helped prompt a distinctive reading of
due process and a theory of judicial review to go with it. The text of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not forbid deprivations
of life, liberty, and property simpliciter, of course.99 It prohibits deprivation
92. Id. at 27.
93. Id. at 27-29.
94. Williams, supra note 80, at 460-67.
95. Id. at 468 n.277.
96. The first hints of this approach came as early as Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102
(1877), in which Justice Miller suggested that to satisfy due process, the legislature would be obliged
to offer an acceptable substantive reason for depriving a person of property. See also Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661-63 (1887) (stating that the Court has a duty to adjudge whether a statute
has any "real or substantial relation" to the state's police powers or invades "rights secured by
fundamental law"); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 708 (1885) (stating that courts will only
interfere with municipal regulations if the regulations "invad[e] the substantial rights of persons");
Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 26 (1885) ("[The statute] has not deprived him of his
property without due process of law .... ).
97. See DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN
AMERICA 112-19 (1980) (discussing the increased social opportunity created by the development
of the manufacturing industry in America); Forbath, supra note 39, at 774-75 (analyzing the societal
benefits of the "free labor system").
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2014]
Texas Law Review [Vol. 93:275
without appropriate process. 100 The Clause says nothing about reasonable
police power regulation. Yet by the 1860s, the vested rights tradition had
conditioned courts to think of "due process of law" as coterminous with rules
against unreasonable interference with property.'0 ' And prevailing
nineteenth-century views on the connection between property and liberty
made it a natural further step to cast those rules against unreasonable property
interference as rules protecting liberty. By the middle 1880s, the Supreme
Court was reading the Due Process Clause in just this fashion, not as a
guarantee of process---or not only as that-but as a more general restraint on
arbitrary interferences with liberty. 10 2 In short, the Court read the Clause to
protect a general value of liberty.10 3
Reading the Clause in this way produced a new role for the Court. 10 4 If
due process was a command to protect liberty, if the Due Process Clause
embodied a general value of liberty, then the Clause obliged the Court to
define that liberty and simultaneously authorized it to enforce this definition
with the powers of judicial review. This was a role the Court had never
before claimed, and its assumption carried fairly dramatic structural
consequences. It was these consequences, and their political implications,
that spurred the backlash against the Court's police powers jurisprudence in
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The same is true of the Fifth Amendment version. U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
101. Harrison, supra note 2, at 498-99. See generally JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW:
A BRIEF HISTORY 9-11, 51-72 (2003) (tracing, from the 1870s to 1930s, the effect of incorporating
property interference into due process).
102. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 375-82 (1985).
103. For a discussion and critique of "generality shifting," the practice of reading a specific
piece of legal text to stand for a more general value or principle, see generally John F. Manning,
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003
(2009).
104. Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have recently emphasized the separation of
powers concerns at the nerve of antebellum due process doctrine, both in the states and at the U.S.
Supreme Court. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012). Chapman and McConnell mount a persuasive case that the
doctrine that prevented legislatures from "taking from A to give to B" had much to do with the
separation-of-powers idea that of vested property rights could come only by order of a court,
following a fair hearing and pursuant to neutral and generally applicable law. Id. at 1726-40, 1762.
But Chapman and McConnell have notably little to say about the evolution of the vested rights
tradition or the changing notions of property that went with it. And they give no attention to the
emergence of the police powers construct as both a theory of the state's sovereignty and a limit on
the (evolving) vested rights doctrine. Consequently, their account treats the emergence of police
powers due process, with its review of legislation for substantive reasonableness, as a legal novelty,
even a shock. Id. at 1677-81, 1726-27. In fact, as this Part has elaborated, the conceptual and
doctrinal antecedents for substantive reasonableness review were in place at least as early as the
middle 1800s. This is not to say that police powers due process was entirely consonant with the
earlier vested rights tradition; on the contrary, as I have tried to explain, police powers due process
was something new. But to characterize it as a sudden intrusion of "natural law" thinking, id. at
1677-79, is somewhat misleading.
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the early years of the 1900s and provoked the modernist critique of the
doctrine articulated definitively by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.
B. The Holmesian Critique
Justice Holmes rejected both the notion of liberty that animated the
police powers doctrine and the uses of judicial review the doctrine
recommended. Holmes was a positivist-perhaps the first legal positivist in
American historyl° 5-and his positivism told him that property rights were
the creation of legal rules and customs, not prepolitical artifacts that defined
the boundaries of the state. Holmes rejected the idea of prepolitical rights
altogether, just as he rejected the notion of objective moral truth.'0 6 And with
those twin convictions, Holmes repudiated the very foundations of the police
powers doctrine. Precisely because he thought no set of preexisting natural
rights marked a clear boundary between public and private, state and citizen,
Holmes regarded all questions about government power and its uses as value
choices.' 0 7 And given this, he saw no reason why, in a democracy, the courts
should make such choices rather than the representatives elected by the
people. 108 He was never willing to believe that the Due Process Clause
inscribed a general concept of "liberty" that gave the judiciary license to
make what were, for him, political judgments. 10 9 The only backstop Holmes
permitted his account of majoritarian democracy was an elusive reference to
"fundamental principles."110 That small reservation would turn out to be
quite important, but almost certainly not in the manner Holmes intended and
not until Holmesian positivism had carried the day.
Justice Holmes's critique of police powers due process began with his
sharply divergent understanding of property. Holmes rejected the Lockean
account of property rights as natural possessions that instigated and then
defined the social contract.11' According to Holmes, what the law called
property was nothing other than a historically contingent collection of legal
rules and conventional practices. 1 2 Which is to say, what the law called
"property" was nothing other than what the law made "property."1 3
105. Morton J. Horwitz, The Place of Justice Holmes in American Legal Thought, in THE
LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 31, 67-68 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992). For a general
assessment of Justice Holmes's thought, see HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 109-13, 116, 123-42 and
WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 35, at 131-35.
106. Brauneis, supra note 66, at 636-37.
107. See White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 89-90 (explaining Justice Holmes's
skepticism of the public-private distinction and the rule against class legislation).
108. Id. at 89.
109. Id. at 91-92.
110. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
111. See Brauneis, supra note 66, at 639 (explaining that Holmes rejected the idea of a human
telos as the basis for property rights).
112. Id. at 631.
113. Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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"Property, a creation of law, does not arise from value," Justice Holmes wrote
in 1918.114 More broadly, Holmes doubted that there were any such things
as prepolitical, natural rights. 15 This conviction placed him squarely in
conflict with the most foundational assumption of the police powers
jurisprudence. Believers in natural rights claimed that individuals had certain
privileges prior to the state and society that defined the powers of the political
sphere.1 16  Holmes by contrast claimed that "[1]egal duties are logically
antecedent to legal rights."'1 17 There were no rights apart from political life,
that is, apart from social custom and political command."18
Behind Holmes's dismissal of natural rights stood a profound-and
profoundly modem-skepticism at the very possibility of knowing anything
permanent or true about the reality of things. 19 As Holmes famously
explained in 1915: "When I say that a thing is true, I mean that I cannot help
believing it. ' ' 120 He later elaborated to a private correspondent: "I have no
grounds for assuming that my can't helps are cosmic can't helps ....
Absolute truth is a mirage."' 21  As for human nature, Holmes similarly
doubted there was anything permanent to disclose. Like his fellow prag-
matists, Holmes concluded that human behavior, beliefs, and ideals were
historically conditioned. 122 It made no sense, then, to talk of deriving rights
from human nature or from larger truth claims about the shape of reality.
None of that was possible. 123
These convictions led Holmes to question the basic story the police
powers doctrine told. That doctrine pictured society divided between a
private sphere of liberty and a public realm of state action. 124  Holmes
114. Id.
115. White, Canonization of Holmes, supra note 35, at 580.
116. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
117. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 148 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (1881).
118. See WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 35, at 133-34 (describing Justice
Holmes's commitment to majoritarian democracy).
119. See Brauneis, supra note 66, at 636-42 (discussing Holmes's rejection of the idea that the
law can be organized around or deduced from a preexisting moral order).
120. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1915).
121. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL
HOLMES: SELECTION FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 107, 107 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992).
122. See JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND
PROGRESSIVISM IN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870-1920, at 107-14 (1986)
(explaining the progressive rejection of permanent moral truths in favor of moral historicism).
123. See HORWITZ, supra note 39, at 53-55 (explaining legal philosophers' rejection of the idea
of objective causation); Brauneis, supra note 66, at 631-37 (describing Justice Holmes's anti-telic,
historicist jurisprudence); White, Canonization of Holmes, supra note 35, at 580-83 (explaining
modernists' endorsement of human will, rather than a permanent moral order, as the major factor in
shaping the law).
124. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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doubted these spheres could be so neatly separated. 125 Moreover, because
Holmes did not believe the private sphere was created by natural property
rights, he saw no reason to associate it uniquely with liberty.126 Indeed,
Holmes thought that in some cases government action might promote, rather
than diminish, personal freedom, at least if that freedom had any connection
to one's conditions of life.127  "[A]s a fact[,] freedom may dis-
appear... through the power of aggregated money or men," Holmes wrote
in 191 4-that is, at the hands of actors in the private market. 128 Government
intervention to counteract this aggregation might actually bolster what Justice
Holmes called "practical freedom."'
2 9
All this led Holmes to reject the use ofjudicial review the police powers
doctrine recommended. If law was not a question of permanent rights but of
weighing competing policy interests, then the policy balance struck by the
legislature should, in a democracy, be respected absent some extraordinary
circumstance. 130 Yet the police powers doctrine made courts the arbiters of
policy by asking them to determine whether the legislature's conclusions
were "reasonable."' 131 Holmes thought this threatened the basic order of
democratic government as adopted by the American people. 132 "I think that
the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is held to
prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion," Holmes wrote in his
Lochner dissent.'
33
The Holmesian critique rejected nearly every aspect of police powers
due process. Indeed, the very totality of the rejection implied that Holmes
was willing to abandon altogether the effort to find limits on the lawmaking
power. But in fact, he was not willing to go quite that far.134 Holmes was
prepared to enforce "specific provisions of the Constitution," as he said some
years later in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.13 5 He added an additional
qualifier: Courts could legitimately brake the "dominant opinion" of the
legislature if "a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute
125. See White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 106 (identifying Justice Holmes as the
sole Justice on the Lochner Court to reject strict boundaries between the public and private spheres).
126. Id. at 110-12.
127. Id. at 111.
128. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 298 (Paul A. Freund & Stanley
N. Katz eds., 1984) (quoting from an opinion draft of Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S.
224 (1914)).
129. Id.
130. Horwitz, supra note 105, at 55.
13 1. White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 101; see also White, Canonization of
Holmes, supra note 35, at 584 (noting that judicial invalidation of such laws revolved around
whether they were deemed rational or arbitrary).
132. Horwitz, supra note 105, at 70.
133. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
134. White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 126.
135. 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been
understood by the traditions of our people and our law., 136
Holmes did not pause to elaborate what he had in mind. Perhaps, in
view of his subsequent statements in Adkins137 and his later jurisprudence of
free speech,13 ' he was thinking of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Or perhaps he was referring to naked transfers of property from one person
to another without process or compensation.33 He did not say. And in one
sense, it hardly mattered. Holmes's point was that the police powers doctrine
did not count as fundamental, and its reading of the Due Process Clause was
not deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. 41 Still, the reservation
constituted an implicit admission that the project of finding limits on
democratic lawmaking power could not be abandoned entirely. What those
limits might be, Holmes left to another day.
For now, Holmes was content to demolish the police powers
jurisprudence. And though he stood alone in Lochner, his dissent signaled a
sea change. In the decade and a half following Lochner, the Court steadily
broadened the types of interests it said would support the police power's
use.14 ' The end came finally in 1937 in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,42 after
Justice Holmes had left the Court.143 The case concerned a minimum wage
law for women. 144  Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the
majority. His opinion assembled several precedents from the Court's collage
of police power cases to support the result. 145 But the centerpiece of the
decision was his meditation on liberty.
"The Constitution," he wrote, "does not speak of freedom of contract.
It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due
process of law."' 146 And liberty, Hughes hastened to add, bore no fixed
meaning but necessarily took on the color of the time: "Liberty in each of its
phases has its history and connotation." '47 Which is to say, it changed, based
136. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76.
137. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (addressing the Fifth Amendment).
138. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). For an analysis of Justice
Holmes's free speech decisions, see WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 35, at
144-48.
139. White, Revisiting Due Process, supra note 6, at 89.
140. Id. at 125-26.
141. In 1917, for example, the Court announced the police power included an "interest in the
prevention of pauperism, with its concomitants of vice and crime." N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. White, 243
U.S. 188, 207 (1917).
142. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
143. Justice Holmes left the Court in 1932. WHITE, JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 35, at 467.
144. Parrish, 300 U.S. at 386.
145. Id. at 397-98.




on social circumstances. Freedom of contract and the understanding of labor,
property, and rights it reflected was one "connotation," good for its day. But
its day was gone. Though he invoked the traditional police power categories,
the thrust of Hughes's reasoning denied them salience. 148 If liberty no longer
meant most fundamentally the right to labor and to sell one's labor, if it no
longer inhered in property of exchangeable value, then the rules fashioned to
protect those things no longer constrained. And indeed, Hughes concluded,
government regulation need only be "reasonable in relation to its subject"
and "adopted in the interests of the community" to be valid. 149
The Court had lost faith in the constitutional vision of the police powers
doctrine-in that doctrine's account of liberty, in the definition of
governmental power it implied, and in the uses of judicial review it
prescribed for the courts. With Parrish, the project of protecting liberty by
limiting government intrusion in the private realm had come to a close.
Still, even as it abandoned exacting scrutiny of economic regulation, the
Court continued to embrace the idea that the Due Process Clause enacted a
general value of liberty and gave the judiciary the power to enforce it.
Indeed, the very premise of Chief Justice Hughes's opinion in Parrish was
that the Due Process Clause embraced a substantive liberty value-
"[1]iberty ... has its ... connotation," he said' 5 -it was simply that this value
changed with time. This generality-shifting interpretation of the Clause was
the culmination of police powers reasoning and perhaps the most enduring
legacy of the police powers era. The Court never rejected it. And as a
consequence, the generalized reading would survive to inform the revival of
substantive due process in the late 1960s. 15'
In the meantime, the force of the positivist critique drove the Court
away, not from the liberty value of the Fourteenth Amendment but from
speculative reasoning about what that value might mean. In the face of
Holmesian moral skepticism, grand theorizing about "liberty" seemed
implausible. Hughes rejected the definition of liberty at back of the police
powers doctrine but declined to offer a philosophical alternative. Instead, the
Justices turned to the text of the Constitution. 52 Not coincidentally, just a
year after Parrish the Court decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,'
53
abandoning federal common law with all its background natural law
norms.'54 It was the beginning of a positivist retrenchment. For the next
thirty years, the Court labored to refound its due process jurisprudence in the




151. See infra subparts IV(A)-(B).
152. See infra Part II.
153. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
154. Id. at 78.
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positive law of the Constitution and to jettison the doctrine's "substantive,"
nontextual aspects. 155 This marked a major departure from the police powers
era, even as it carried over and revised that era's general reading of the Due
Process Clause. The result was the creation of a key component of modem
substantive due process: the doctrine of fundamental rights.
II. Discovering Fundamental Rights
One of the most persistent misconceptions regarding the origins of
modem substantive due process is the idea that the modem doctrine
perpetuated a fundamental rights jurisprudence begun by Lochner.156 In fact,
the doctrine of fundamental rights arose only after the demise of the police
powers jurisprudence and was, in its inception, a doctrine keyed to the text
of the Constitution.
In the aftermath of its rejection of police powers due process, the Court
developed an alternative doctrinal framework for protecting liberty under the
Fourteenth Amendment, one that took on board the central premises of the
positivist critique. 157 The Court would no longer speculate about inherent
rights or the "nature of our free Republican governments.' 58  Instead,
retrieving Justice Holmes's suggestion in Lochner that the Fourteenth
Amendment might prevent the government from infringing certain
"fundamental principles," 159 the Court would deploy the power of judicial
review to guard those rights specifically enumerated in the Constitution that
it designated as "fundamental.""16
What made some rights fundamental and others not became, in the years
following Parrish, the central question of the Court's due processjurisprudence. Different Justices offered different theories. Justice Felix
Frankfurter argued that those rights specially connected to the political
process were the fundamental ones.161 Chief Justice Harlan Stone contended
155. See infra Part 11.
156. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
157. See Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the
New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 478-79 (2001) (discussing Chief Justice
Hughes's reference to the Fourteenth Amendment in Parrish and how that case marked the
beginnings of a new method ofjudicial review).
158. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis omitted).
159. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be
narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.").
161. See, e.g., Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940) ("Except where the
transgression of constitutional liberty is too plain for argument, personal freedom is best
maintained-so long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain open and
unobstructed .. "); cf FELIX FRANKFURTER, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes's Constitutional
Opinions, in FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT 112, 117-20 (Philip B. Kurland ed.,
1970) (warning of the dangers posed by the "unrestrained" language of the Due Process Clause).
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that it was the "preferred freedoms" of speech, press, assembly, and
religion.1 62 Justice Hugo Black meanwhile pressed for "total incorporation"
of all rights listed in the first eight Amendments. 63  But whatever the
catalogue of rights they deemed fundamental, each of these Justices looked
to the textual provisions of the Bill of Rights to define the universe of possible
candidates. The positivist critique had taken hold. While the Court continued
to read the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to inscribe a
general value of liberty, it now worked to fill out that liberty value by
reference to the Constitution's specific rights guarantees.64 This produced a
different sort of due process. Whereas the police powers doctrine protected
liberty by enforcing general limits on the government's power to intervene in
the private sphere, the post-Parrish framework selected particular rights for
protection. This doctrine of fundamental rights at once distanced the Court
from the Lochner era and prepared the ground for the arrival of modem
substantive due process.
The Court's newly positivist approach to due process was on display at
the very moment it laid the police powers doctrine to rest. In Palko v.
Connecticut' 65-- decided the same term as West Coast Hotel v. Parrish-the
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit criminal appeals
by state prosecutors, despite the fact such appeals were barred at the federal
level by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 66 Writing for the
majority, Justice Benjamin Cardozo reiterated the Court's position since the
Slaughter-House Cases167 that the Fourteenth Amendment did not make the
Bill of Rights generally applicable against the states.' 68  Still, Cardozo
reasoned, some of the "specific pledges of particular amendments [were] ...
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and, for that reason, binding on
state governments. 169 Here was the generalized reading of due process
fostered by the police powers doctrine put to new use. The Fourteenth
Amendment protected a "scheme of ordered liberty," Cardozo wrote7 °-a
162. The classic statement comes in Chief Justice Stone's dissent in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting) ("The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding
freedom of speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe them out. On
the contrary, the Constitution, by virtue of the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, has put those
freedoms in a preferred position.").
163. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I would follow
what I believe was the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment-to extend to all people of
the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights.").
164. See Lash, supra note 157, at 514 (noting that the post-New Deal Court started to limit due
process rights to those "specifically expressed" in the Constitution).
165. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
166. Id. at 328-29.
167. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
168. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323-24.
169. Id. at 324-25 (footnote omitted).
170. Id. at 325.
2014]
Texas Law Review
liberty value. Or as the Court said the same term in De Jonge v. Oregon"':
"[F]undamental principles of liberty and justice... lie at the base of all civil
and political institutions,-principles which the Fourteenth Amendment
embodies in the general terms of its due process clause."' 172 But this liberty
value was now to be defined not by the natural right to property and the
private sphere it created, but by "the specific pledges of particular
amendments. 173
Justice Cardozo was careful to note that not every right protected by
constitutional amendment was essential to the scheme of ordered liberty.
Palko held that the Fifth Amendment bar on criminal appeals by the
government was not. 174 It was up to the courts to ask whether the textual
right at issue was "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental. ' 75
Palko was not the first time the Court had referred to "fimdamental
principles"' 176 in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment. As early as
Hurtado v. California177 in 1884, the Court had held that while historical
practice generally indicated the range of legal procedures that were
constitutionally acceptable, only those procedures that were truly
"fundamental" were affirmatively required by the Due Process Clause. 78
The Court pursued this same line of thought in Twining v. New Jersey,179
decided in 1908. The question there was whether the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination applied to the states.1 80 The Court held it did not,
but not before announcing that Fourteenth Amendment due process protects
"immutable principle[s] of justice. ' 181 On that basis, the Court suggested in
dicta that "it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the
first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded
against state action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process
of law."'
182
171. 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
172. Id. at 364.
173. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25.
174. Id. at 328-29.
175. Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal quotations
omitted).
176. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
177. 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
178. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY,
1888-1986, at 245-46 (1990); see also Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 534-35 (reasoning that "the institution
and procedure of a grand jury" was not included in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause because of differences in the language of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
179. 211 U.S. 78(1908).
180. Id. at 90-91.
181. Id. at 113-14.
182. Id. at 99.
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Hurtado and Twining were process cases, but in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago1 83 in 1897 the Court had held that the Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation-something more than a process
guarantee-applied against state governments because it was essential to the
"substance" of due process of law.184  And in Gitlow v. New York, 185 a
majority of the Court "assume[d]" for sake of argument that "freedom of
speech and of the press ... are among the fundamental personal rights and
'liberties' protected by the due process clause," 186 and for that reason
applicable against the states.'
87
These earlier cases invoking "fundamental rights" or "principles" bore
only a tenuous relationship to the police powers framework. The Court
justified them initially on the theory that the Due Process Clause safeguarded
only that legal process that was fundamental and later on the basis that certain
personal rights might be constitutionally protected because they were central
to maintaining the private sphere of liberty. 88  Palko drew these cases
together and supplied a doctrinal frame oriented toward the constitutional
text.1 89 The fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause were those enumerated rights so essential to the "concept of
ordered liberty" that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed."'1 90 These rights, by virtue of their fundamentality, were drawn
"by a process of absorption" into the Clause 191: they defined the meaning of
the liberty value.
Using this analysis, the Palko Court rechristened various cases decided
under the police powers rubric as "incorporation" cases about the Bill of
Rights. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,1 92 for instance, decided in 1925, the
183. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
184. Id. at 235, 241.
185. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
186. Id. at 666.
187. Id. Because the Court concluded the defendant's First Amendment rights had not been
violated, the Court's "assumption" was not binding. Id. at 670-72. Justices Holmes and Brandeis
dissented and would have held explicitly that the First Amendment right to speech applied against
the states. Id. at 672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908). Writing for the Court, Justice William
Moody observed:
[C]onsistently with the requirements of due process, no change in ancient procedure
can be made which disregards those fundamental principles, to be ascertained from
time to time by judicial action, which have relation to process of law and protect the
citizen in his private right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government.
Id.; see also CURRIE, supra note 102, at 367 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532, 535
(1884)) (noting that due process must limit state law from infringing on substantive rights, not
merely procedural rights).
189. Lash, supra note 157, at 483-85.
190. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
191. Id. at 326-27.
192. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Court had concluded that a state law requiring children to attend public
elementary and secondary schools unreasonably infringed both private
schools' contractual rights and parents' right to direct the upbringing of their
children by contracting with private schools for their education. 193  The
Court's holding was squarely within the police powers frame: its conclusion
was that state law trenched on the sphere of private liberty without adequate
justification. 194 Palko, however, treated Pierce as a free exercise case.195
Then-Justice Harlan Stone (later Chief Justice) performed a similar maneuver
in United States v. Carolene Products,196 decided the same term as Palko. In
his famed footnote four, Justice Stone casually referred to another Lochner-
era case involving a teacher's contractual rights, Meyer v. Nebraska,'97 as
turning on ethnic discrimination-and therefore, presumably, on the rights to
equal protection-rather than on the state's ability to regulate "liberty" using
its police powers. 198
Palko represented a new turn in the Court's due process jurisprudence.
Whether a particular governmental regulation was "reasonable" would no
longer bear the weight of the due process inquiry.' 99 Instead, the Court would
focus on whether the government action touched an enumerated right
understood as "fundamental., 20 0  As Justice Stone wrote in Carolene
Products, the Court would treat "regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions" as presumptively constitutional from now on, but
not when the "legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
193. Id. at 534-36.
194. Id.
195. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324.
196. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
197. 262 U.S. 390, 400, 403 (1923) (holding that state regulations restricting foreign-language
education infringed teachers' contract rights and parents' right to direct their children's education).
198. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
199. The Hughes Court continued to hold out the prospect, rather half-heartedly, that some
legislation might be struck down for lack of "reasonableness," though on what theory and in what
circumstances it never quite said. See, e.g., id. at 153. Writing for the Court, then-Justice Stone
explained:
Where the existence of a rational basis for legislation whose constitutionality is
attacked depends upon facts beyond the sphere of judicial notice, such facts may
properly be made the subject of judicial inquiry, and the constitutionality of a statute
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by
showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist.
Id. (citation omitted). In any event, the Court was no longer much interested in the question. It
would not invalidate legislation on reasonableness grounds for almost fifty years, and when it did,
its holding had nothing to do with the police powers doctrine. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447-48 (1985) (invalidating a housing ordinance requiring a special
permit for "a facility for the mentally retarded" because the ordinance failed the rational basis test).
200. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25; Lash, supra note 157, at 483-84.
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Fourteenth., 20 1 In this way, by binding the due process liberty value to the
text of the Constitution, the Court sought to avoid the sort of speculation
about liberty that the positivist critique said invited judicial policy making .
202
If the Palko approach was positivist, it was also circular. It defined the
"liberty" of the Fourteenth Amendment by reference to "fundamental" rights
guarantees, but defined "fundamental" by reference to "the concept of
ordered liberty."20 3  This circularity rendered the Palko method deeply
ambiguous. On the one hand, it might be an essentially historical inquiry as
to whether the right at issue was "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. '20 4 But in other passages in
Palko, Justice Cardozo suggested a far more open-ended test that could
hardly help but call for philosophical reasoning. Rights were fundamental if
"neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed," he offered.20 5
Or this: fundamental rights were those without which "a fair and enlightened
system ofjustice would be impossible., 20 6 This second version of the inquiry
depended critically on what liberty meant: it required some reference to a
metanorm or ideal. After all, one could not decide whether "liberty" would
cease to exist unless one had some idea what liberty was in the first place.
Cardozo, however, was anxious to avoid such theorizing. As he applied
the test in Palko, the historical inquiry got the accent. On the question before
the Court, he concluded that the right against self-incrimination did not "lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions' 207 and therefore did not
bind the states. Still, the circularity problem remained. Unless the Due
Process Clause "absorbed" the Bill of Rights whole, or at least the personal
rights of the first eight Amendments, it was hard to see how the Court could
ultimately avoid relying on some metanorm of liberty to give meaning to the
concept of "fundamental."
No one appreciated the ambivalence at the heart of Palko better than
Justice Hugo Black, who attempted to resolve it by doubling down on the
Court's positivist turn with his theory of "total incorporation., 208 But Black's
201. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 & n.4; Lash, supra note 157, at 484-85.
202. Lash, supra note 157, at 485-87.
203. Palko, 302 U.S. at 324-25, 327.
204. Id. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
205. Id. at 326.
206. Id. at 325.
207. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
208. For the fullest judicial statement of Justice Black's views, see Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). For assessments of Justice Black's views, see AKItlL
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 174-80 (1998); Lash, supra
note 157, at 509-12.
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position would never command a majority.20 9 And in one sense, the failure
of his argument made little difference. The Court eventually incorporated
nearly all of the Bill of Rights, including the right against self-incrimination
at issue in Twining and Palko.210 But in another way, Black's defeat was a
watershed. In rejecting Black's claim that fundamental rights meant all of
those personal rights enumerated in the constitutional text, the Court made
more distinct the possibility that "fundamental rights" might include some
rights not in the Constitution at all. At the end of the day, the Constitution
was not the test of what "fundamental" meant. Rather, the meaning of liberty
was the test. For the years following Palko until the middle 1960s,2 1 the
Court ventured no further definition of the Due Process Clause's liberty
value--or at least, no systematic one. It was content to expand protections
for speech, press, religion, and criminal defendants (to name a few)
interstitially, on a case-by-case basis, and without elaborate theoretical
justification. 212 Developments in the world of ideas, however, would shortly
supply a new concept of liberty and with it, the catalyst for a new reading of
the Due Process Clause.
III. The Ethic of Authenticity
The collapse of the police powers doctrine represented more than the
demise of a discrete line of cases. It represented the eclipse of an entire
intellectual world. The police powers jurisprudence was bound up with an
integrated way of thinking about rights, liberty, democracy, and even human
nature-a worldview-that came apart in the early twentieth century.2" 3 This
collapse produced a severe sense of dislocation in the law no less than in
209. For much of Justice Black's tenure on the Court, the principal opposition came from
Justice Felix Frankfurter, a disciple of Justice Holmes who was as devoted to judicial restraint as
Black, but who feared total incorporation would empower the federal judiciary too far by
authorizing it to sit in perpetual judgment on state legislation. See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 62
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that to apply the Bill of Rights to the states in full would
"fasten[] upon the States procedural arrangements which, in the language of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
only those who are 'narrow or provincial' would deem essential to 'a fair and enlightened system
ofjustice"' (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325)).
210. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764-65 (2010).
211. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (emphasizing individuals' right
to privacy).
212. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256, 279-80 (1964) (establishing
a stringent "actual malice" standard for damages for public defamation); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (announcing that the right to counsel in a criminal trial is a fundamental
right); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318, 322-25 (1957) (tightening the "clear and present
danger" standard to protect advocacy of government overthrow, without further action, as free
speech); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause to the states).
213. GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 192-93; see also BAILEY, supra note 39, at 208-09
(describing the breakdown of traditional jurisprudential frameworks).
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philosophy,214 but it also touched off a period of intense intellectual
creativity. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, democratic
theorists worked to forge a new understanding of the liberal project, one
premised on the progressive critique of the old order so forcefully articulated
by Justice Holmes. Perhaps the most important early contributor to this effort
was John Dewey.
Drawing on a vein of romantic individualism present in Western thought
since at least Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 215 Dewey suggested that the true value
of liberal democracy inhered in its ability to stimulate individual "growth,"
by which he meant the development and realization of the individual's
potentialities-what one might call the individual's authenticity.216 Dewey
replaced the natural-rights emphasis characteristic of earlier liberal thought
with a nonteleological, relativist ethic, centered on the individual.217 The
crisis of the Second World War pressed liberal thinkers to translate Dewey's
relativist, romantic liberalism into a full-scale defense of democracy and also
of human rights.218 The final yield was a new explanation of liberty,
grounded on a thoroughgoing moral and intellectual relativism joined to an
account of the individual's need-and ultimately the individual's right-to
personal authenticity and self-development. 21 9 This is the ethic that would
underwrite the rebirth of substantive due process.
A. John Dewey's Romantic Liberalism
John Dewey was a social scientist and philosopher who began his
scholarly career writing about psychology before migrating to ethics,
political philosophy, and educational theory.220 A contemporary of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Dewey belonged to the pragmatist set of thinkers
and theorists that exercised prodigious influence on the intellectual agenda
of the progressive period and, besides Justice Holmes, included such
214. See GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 193, 205 (describing the Court's loss of its previous
jurisprudential basis and the need to develop "new constitutional foundations"); KLOPPENBERG,
supra note 122, at 39-41 (discussing the philosophical change that accompanied the abandonment
of the police powers doctrine).
215. See infra section III(A)(1).
216. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, INDIVIDUALISM: OLD AND NEW 157-60 (Capricorn Books 1962)
(1930) (discussing the potential for and importance of human growth within a society); John J.
Stuhr, Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy, in READING DEWEY: INTERPRETATIONS FOR A
POSTMODERN GENERATION 82, 95 (Larry A. Hickman ed., 1998) (explaining Dewey's suggestion
was that a "society... is not fully free unless it makes available to its members the prerequisites of
their growth").
217. See infra section III(A)(2).
218. See infra subpart III(B).
219. See infra subpart III(C).
220. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 41-45; see also 8 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY 352-53 (1985) (listing Dewey's published works for different periods of his life).
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prominent figures as William James and Charles Peirce. 221 This was an
influential cohort and Dewey was no exception: by the 1920s, he was the
most recognized liberal theorist in America.222
Dewey's political philosophy was defined by his foundational commit-
ment to pragmatism, which he described as a commitment to identifying
ethical principles through a process of trial and error-problem solving-
rather than by finding out preexisting moral truths.223 Indeed, like Justice
Holmes, Dewey was a moral skeptic. 224 He doubted that there were such
things as moral facts that existed in the universe apart from particular human
communities and particular human wants.225 Truth, ideals, norms-these
were constructed in response to felt needs.2 26 No norm or ideal could be
called permanent. On the contrary, all social values were subject to revision
as human circumstances changed.227 "The hypothesis that works," Dewey
said, "is the true one. 228
The symmetry between Dewey and Holmes in their basic posture of
skepticism and rejection of moral absolutes-an attitude I will shorthand, for
these purposes, as their "relativism" 229-is striking. But while Holmes was
content to leave it at that, privately describing democracy as nothing more
221. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 41-42. For a popular account of those intellectual
thinkers and their ideas, see generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (2001).
222. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 43-46 (noting Dewey's importance in political
philosophy); ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, at ix-x (1991)
(describing Dewey as the "most important philosopher in modem American history").
223. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 45-46; WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 126-30.
224. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC
NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 42 (1973) (describing Dewey as a "whole-hearted
antagonist of all absolutism"); WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 130-31 (noting that in Dewey's
view, truth "was not found but 'made"'); Gregory F. Pappas, Dewey's Ethics: Morality as
Experience, in READING DEWEY: INTERPRETATIONS FOR A POSTMODERN GENERATION, supra note
216, at 100, 102-12 (describing "Dewey's opposition to rules, fixed ends, and universal standards").
For broad overviews of Dewey's thought on this and related points, see generally THOMAS M.
ALEXANDER, JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF ART, EXPERIENCE, AND NATURE (1987), as well as
Richard Rorty's famous (if famously tendentious) account of Dewey's antirealism in RICHARD
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 5-13 (1979).
225. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 43 ("Truth, Dewey insisted, is not revealed once
and for all but created in time by individuals participating in a community dedicated to and fired by
religious ideas. Truth is created on earth by man's thought, reason, and activity.").
226. Id.; see also John Dewey, Social Science and Social Control, 67 NEW REPUBLIC 276, 276
(193 1) (arguing that social science, unlike physical fact finding, is inexorably connected to human
purposes, values, and desires).
227. COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 356-57.
228. JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY 156 (Beacon Press 1972) (1920) (first
emphasis added); see also PURCELL, supra note 224, at 29 (discussing Dewey's commitment to
scientific analysis as a way of "understanding the social universe").
229. This term is of course a controversial one with many and varied meanings. I use it in the
same sense as PURCELL, supra note 224, at 41-46, merely as shorthand and without implying any
position in the broader theoretical debate about relativism's meaning and import.
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than rule of the majority by force, 230 Dewey sought to convert his relativist
convictions into a reformed and positive account of the liberal-project.
Clearing away the talk about natural rights and permanent truths brought to
the fore, Dewey believed, what made political liberty truly worthwhile: the
ability of citizens to impart meaning to their experience through self-
development.231 Liberty in Dewey's reckoning was profoundly connected
with the individual's ability to be truly herself: to be or become, authentic.232
Dewey placed this notion of authenticity at the center of his reformed
liberalism. 233 But it was hardly a new idea. On the contrary, it was precisely
because authenticity was such a resonant concept in the Western tradition
that it could animate Dewey's thought as it did. Dewey's contribution was
to connect this ethic to progressive liberalism, giving it-and liberalism-a
new turn.
1. The Genealogy of Authenticity.-The constitutive elements of the
idea of authenticity emerged in the Western tradition very early on.
Augustine of Hippo may have been the first expositor.234 The second-century
Christian bishop and philosopher contended that knowledge of the Good and
of God comes not primarily from the external world, but from within.235 "Do
not go abroad," Augustine famously taught, "Return within yourself. In the
inward man dwells truth., 236 The way to encounter God, he instructed, was
to contemplate the divine pattern of one's soul and to listen for God's voice
within. "[T]his light by which [outer things] become manifest is certainly
within the soul," Augustine said.237 This was something new. Augustine
230. Cf WHITE, JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 35, at 60 (mentioning Holmes's stpport for
economic freedom and his disinterest in redistributive legislation or "social assimilation").
231. See COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 367-73 (discussing Dewey's theory that social
progress depends on "promoting the fullest possible development in desirable ways of the capacities
of individuals"); Stuhr, supra note 216, at 91-97 (explaining Dewey's commitment to independent
thought and self-realization); cf DEWEY, supra note 216, at 184 (emphasizing education as an
instrumentality to independence and fulfillment).
232. Stuhr, supra note 216, at 94.
233. See infra section II(A)(2).
234. See H. MARK ROELOFS, THE TENSION OF CITIZENSHIP: PRIVATE MAN AND PUBLIC DUTY
142-54 (1957) (connecting Augustine's commitment to the pursuit of truth to an ethic of
citizenship); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 127-
39 (1989) (discussing Augustine's spirituality, focusing on self-reflection and inner truth).
235. TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 129. For discussion of this point and Augustine's dependence
on Platonic anthropology, see generally GEORGE TAVARD, LES JARDINS DE SAINT AUGUSTIN:
LECTURE DES CONFESSIONS 25-39 (1988); see also Rowan Williams, The Paradoxes of Self-
Knowledge in the De Trinitate, in AUGUSTINE 121 (J. Lienhard et al eds., 1993).
236. AUGUSTINE, OF TRUE RELIGION 69 (J.H.S. Burleigh trans., 1959).
237. TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 129-30.
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suggested for the first time in western philosophy that the good life depended
on a realm of individual interiority.23
But it was Jean-Jacques Rousseau who gave authenticity as such its first
thorough articulation. 239  Rousseau absorbed Augustine's claim that the
Good, and with it the ends of human life, were discovered within.24' But he
described the voice the individual heard in that innermost place differently.
For Rousseau, the turn inward was a turn not to God, but to the unique,
subjective voice of the individual. 241 There was no one "truth of nature"
because there was no one "nature of man," only the natures of each person
for him or herself.242 "I know my own heart and understand my fellow man,"
Rousseau explained. 243 "I may be no better, but at least I am different.",244
The Good was an inherently subjective thing, to be found by each person-
and this by connecting to her deepest and truest self.245
The tragedy, according to Rousseau, was that this self was hard to
find.246  The desire to please others and appear as worthwhile in their
estimation induced the individual to follow social prescriptions rather than
her true personhood.247 Social dependence closed the individual off to
herself, separating her from the wellspring of her individuality; it made her
shallow, false, and morally disoriented.248 Moral salvation came from
authenticity. To overcome alienation and meaninglessness, the person
238. See id. at 133 (suggesting that Augustine was "the first to make the first-person standpoint
fundamental to our search for the truth").
239. See MARSHALL BERMAN, THE POLITICS OF AUTHENTICITY: RADICAL INDIVIDUALISM
AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN SOCIETY 75-88 (1970) (discussing the originality of Rousseau's
conception of the "search for authenticity"); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY
26-27 (1991) (noting that Rousseau revived and extended Augustine's ideas on reflexive self-
awareness).
240. See TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 26-27 (surveying Rousseau's ideological extensions of
and variations on Augustine's theory of self-awareness).
241. TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 357-58.
242. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, CONFESSIONS 17 (J.M. Cohen trans., Penguin Books
1954) (1781) ("My purpose is to display to my kind a portrait in every way true to nature, and the
man I shall portray will be myself.").
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. See BERMAN, supra note 239, at 86 ("The process of confessing, for Rousseau, was a
process of unmasking, of differentiating, of integrating, of bringing his authentic self into being.");
TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 362 (noting that, for Rousseau, "the inner voice of my true sentiments
define what is the good").
246. See BERMAN, supra note 239, at 83-85 (elaborating on Rousseau's belief that men
constantly try to hide who they are, but to know a man's true nature "it [is] necessary to tear men's
veils and costumes and masks away"); TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 27 (noting that the discovery of
such self requires breaking free from the influence of all "external impositions").




needed to reestablish contact with her authentic self, the self that stood apart
from and prior to any moral system or social obligation.249
Recovering this contact was not as easy as identifying a divine pattern
already written in the depths of one's being, however.25° Unlike Augustine,
Rousseau did not believe that the individual's true self existed, already made,
in the mind of God, to be disclosed in a moment of revelation.251 Rather, the
self had to be formed.252  The process of self-reflection was also, and
fundamentally, a process of self-discovery, synthesis, even creation. 3 It was
not enough for the person to know herself. She had to become herself by
constructing an identity in accord with her deepest desires and aspirations.
She could become a true individual only by becoming truly authentic.
25 4
By the time Dewey encountered this constellation of ideas about
authenticity, they had been further refracted by the Romantic movement.
Romantic thinkers like Johann Gottfried Herder, the German poet and
philosopher, championed the idea of cultural and personal originality.255
Persons and people groups, Herder said, each had their own unique way of
being-their own "measure. 256 No person could say to another what life
should mean for her.257 One became an individual by living one's own way
in one's distinctiveness.25 8 To imitate someone else meant to miss the
essence of what it meant for you to be you, and thus what it meant to be
human.25 9 Authenticity was for Herder, as for the Romantics more generally,
a matter of self-expression.260 The person could only be truly human if he
embraced his distinctiveness, and that included making his own moral
choices. 261 The values, beliefs, and practices that gave shape to one's life had
249. See BERMAN, supra note 239, at 83-84 (explaining Rousseau's contention that to know
the true nature of a man, his social "veil" must be stripped away); TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 357-
59 (stating Rousseau's idea that recovering contact with one's nature was seen as an escape from
dependence on others).
250. See TAYLOR, supra note 234, at 357-59 (excerpting a portion of Rousseau's work where
Rousseau notes that apart from "Conscience," Rousseau could "find nothing in [himself] to raise
[him] above the beasts").
251. BERMAN, supra note 239, at 85-86.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.; see also TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 27 (explaining that, for Rousseau, moral salvation
depends on "recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves").
255. See TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 28-29 (noting Herder's proposal that each person "has an
original way of being human").
256. JOHANN GOTTFRIED VON HERDER, This Too a Philosophy of History for the Creation of
Humanity, in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS 272, 273-74 (Michael N. Forster ed. & trans., 2002);
TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 28.
257. TAYLOR, supra note 239, at 28-29.
258. Id. at 28.





to be chosen by oneself, or they could not be meaningful. 62 Moral choice
was central to selfhood.263
The American Romantic and transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson
taught a similar expressivist version of authenticity. 264 "Insist on yourself,"
Emerson preached, "never imitate. Emerson emphasized that moral order
was not to be discovered within the cosmos, but within the individual. 66
Only the individual-not societies or cultures or governments-had the
capacity for true moral choice.2 67 Emerson's expressivism led him to a
radical form of individual self-reliance. He cast society and the state as
oppressive influences to be resisted. "[W]ith the appearance of the wise man,
the State expires," he wrote.268 The truly authentic person had no need for
government; he could direct his own life without the aid of others. "The
appearance of character makes the State unnecessary. 269
What had begun with Augustine as a turn to the inner voice of God had
become by the nineteenth century an ethic of individual moral independence:
of self-discovery, self-fulfillment, and self-expression. This was the ethic
that Dewey employed to fashion a reformed account of liberalism.
270
2. Reforming Liberalism.-The Romantic version of authenticity
treated political society with skepticism-at best. In Emerson's thought, for
example, society and state were forces hostile to individual self-
development. 271  Dewey integrated this highly individualist ethic into a
theory of progressive liberalism that was notably friendly to government
action. He did it by making individual self-realization the aim of political
society. 2  Rather than asking individuals to subordinate their personal ends
to the good of the whole, Dewey cast the good of the whole as the free
262. See id. at 28-29 (arguing that one should not conform to external standards but live by
one' s own).
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., John Holzwarth, Emerson and the Democratization of Intellect, 43 POLITY 313,
314 (2011) (explaining Emerson's theory of self-reliance); George Kateb, Emerson and Self-
Reliance, in 8 MODERNITY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 1, 16-19 (Morton Schoolman ed., 1995)
(same).
265. 1 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in THE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON
18, 35 (1883).
266. See COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 264 (describing the significance of individual self-
reliance in the development of Emerson's moral doctrine).
267. See id. (noting that to Emerson, "[c]onformism [was] a vice").
268. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Politics, in THE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON, supra
note 265, at 236, 244.
269. Id.
270. See ALEXANDER, supra note 224, at 271-73 (summarizing Dewey's views on the
development of culture and the pluralistic democratic ideal).
271. See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
272. WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 438.
[Vol. 93:275
Intellectual Origins
development of personal ends.273 This move built on the relativist premises
Dewey shared with Justice Holmes and the other pragmatists, but went
beyond the critique of natural rights and the private-public distinction to
supply a new and affirmative political ideal: the ideal of authentic self-
development.
As Dewey had it, the relativist rejection of natural rights and a
permanent human telos cleared the path for a more accurate, and ultimately
more inspiring, assessment of human nature, one informed by the ethic of
authenticity.274 Values were not things persons discovered in the universe,
Dewey concluded; values were things individuals made. 275 And by making
values, individuals made themselves. 76 Echoing Emerson, Herder, and
Rousseau before them, 277 Dewey concluded that human nature was not static.
It could change from era to era, culture to culture.278 Which was to say,
individuals had within them the potential for what Dewey called "growth.,
279
He understood this growth to be just the sort of personal discovery that the
ethic of authenticity made central. Growth, Dewey said, meant the
"realization of [individual] capacities"; 280 "self-initiated expression" ;281 the
"develop[ment] [of individual] faculties"; 282 and "full development of
[individual] powers. 283  Individual growth was the outworking of the
individual's distinctiveness, the originality that only she could discover and
articulate.
Dewey converted this capacity for self-development into the touchstone
of political society. He described growth as the ultimate human Good-"the
only moral 'end'" 284-and thus as the ultimate end of politics as well. With
this claim, Dewey replaced the earlier liberalism's commitment to a
particular human telos and the account of rights and society that came from
it with a decidedly non-telic, subjectivist vision of individual choice and self-
realization.285 "Liberalism is committed to an end that is at once enduring
273. Id.
274. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 132-44 (explaining Dewey's nonteleological
ethics).
275. Id. at 133-34.
276. Id. at 139.
277. See supra section III(A)(1).
278. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 140-44 (noting Dewey's rejection of a summum
bonum in favor of the inherently indeterminate ethical standard of democracy).
279. Id. at 140; see also COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 369-74 (elucidating Dewey's
perspective on individual growth as moral end); Stuhr, supra note 216, at 91-97 (discussing
Dewey's understanding of self-actualization as a social product).
280. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 56 (Capricorn Books 1963) (1935).
281. Id. at 90.
282. Id. at 66.
283. Id. at 93.
284. DEWEY, supra note 216, at 177.




and flexible: the liberation of individuals so that realization of their capacities
may be the law of their life," he wrote. 86
This embrace of authentic self-development as the end of political life
produced a new description of liberty and a new role for government. On
Dewey's account, individuals realized their selfhood by discovering their
unique potentials and bringing those potentials to fruition. 87 And that meant
self-discovery and human freedom belonged together. Only if the individual
was able to voice her convictions and pursue her own ends could she be
free.288 Anything less than that, any infringement of her powers of self-
development, would render her less than human.289 "[T]he cause of the
liberty of the human spirit" therefore was "the cause of opportunity of human
beings for full development of their powers. '290 The two were one and the
same.
Dewey's intellectual mentor Emerson might well have agreed, but
Emerson drew from that premise a deep hostility to government. 291 Dewey
came to a different conclusion. Authentic self-development necessitated
government action. 92 Dewey believed that the social and economic circum-
stances of early-twentieth-century America worked to stifle individual
agency.2 93 The withering of the face-to-face rural community, for example,
the ubiquity of wage labor, the epidemic of urban poverty, and the
concentration of economic power in ever fewer hands-these developments,
Dewey thought, denied large numbers of Americans the practical opportunity
294to develop their capacities. That being so, a good many Americans would
cease to be free if government failed to intervene. 95 With this logic, Dewey
turned the older liberalism's solicitude for the individual and his rights
against it. The public-private distinction, he argued, with its implied limits
on government power, destroyed individual freedom rather than advanced it.
"Earlier liberalism regarded the separate and competing economic action of
individuals as the means to social well-being as the end. We must reverse
the perspective," Dewey concluded, "and see that socialized economy is the
means of free individual development as the end., 296
286. DEWEY, supra note 280, at 56.
287. Stuhr, supra note 216, at 93-94.
288. Id. at 94-95.
289. Id. at 95.
290. DEWEY, supra note 280, at 93.
291. See COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 264 (explaining Emerson's belief that individual self-
development and self-reliance, once achieved, render the State unnecessary).
292. Stuhr, supra note 216, at 94-96.
293. WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 434.
294. Id. at 432-35 (highlighting Dewey's identification of the general societal ills of his time
as obstacles to self-realization).
295. Stuhr, supra note 216, at 96 ("Democratic ends, [Dewey] argued, require democratic
means for their realization .... ").
296. DEWEY, supra note 280, at 90.
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In calling for extensive government regulation, even government
planning, of the economy, Dewey drew close to the program of early
twentieth-century socialism. 297 But while socialism prescribed government
organization of economic life for the good of the collective, Dewey
concluded that "[t]he ultimate place of economic organization in human life
is to assure the secure basis for an ordered expression of individual
capacity. 298  His political theory remained, he insisted, a form of
liberalism. 299 But not the liberalism of laissez-faire, rather the liberalism of
individual self-realization and moral progress.30 °
Dewey's embrace of the ethic of authenticity and his associated account
of individual growth affirmed the basic elements of the relativist critique but
moved beyond mere positivism. Democracy, for Dewey, was more than the
rule of the many by force. Democracy rested on an ethical ideal. One of
Dewey's principal contributions to liberal theory was to enable relativists to
champion ethical norms without endorsing any particular moral system as
"true."' 0 ' Rather than abandon ethical norms along with the notion of a
morally charged universe, Dewey derived norms from the very fact of
relativism and subjectivity.30 2  His reformed liberalism jettisoned talk of
natural rights and natural law, only to substitute in its place an ethic of
individual self-development.30 3
Dewey's intellectual synthesis was an impressive achievement and
highly influential. By the 193 0s, Dewey's reformulated, Romantic liberalism
had won a significant following among democratic theorists.304  Still,
Dewey's ideas contained more than a few ambiguities. For one thing, Dewey
had precious little to say about rights. At times, he appeared to regard the
very concept with suspicion as too closely associated with the earlier
liberalism's apology for the market and the separation of public and
297. WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 429-30, 441.
298. DEWEY, supra note 280, at 88 (emphasis added).
299. WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 430-32.
300. Id. at 431-34, 438-39.
301. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 140-42 (describing how Dewey's instrumentalism
provided "a method of answering ethical questions" without deriving "universally applicable"
ethical maxims).
302. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 141 (describing how Dewey rejected "specific
moral guidelines" in favor of providing a process for "solving moral problems"); WESTBROOK,
supra note 222, at 433 (noting that the participation of individuals formed the values of a democratic
society); Stuhr, supra note 216, at 93-95 (arguing that, according to Dewey, a government or society
must foster the growth of its members' individuality).
303. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 139-40; WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 438-39;
Stuhr, supra note 216, at 93-95.




private.3 °5 And that underscored another, more profound ambiguity: just
what sort of freedom was it that Dewey endorsed? Dewey himself called his
new liberalism a form of positive liberty. 3 6 True democracy, Dewey argued,
democracy for individual self-development, set the human person "free
positively, free to live his own life, free to express himself.' 30 7 Liberalism
could never focus merely on the absence of external restraints, Dewey said.3°8
So-called negative freedom failed to guarantee that individuals would have
the opportunity to develop their personalities. 30 9
This was true not only because the conditions of twentieth-century life,
if not alleviated by the state, closed off the avenues for personal development
for a good many Americans. It was also true because humans were social
creatures.310 Human development took place only within society, and for this
reason it was only through collective social action in the form of government
that individuals could achieve the growth that Dewey regarded as the aim of
living.311 Indeed, for all his emphasis on the individual, Dewey more than
occasionally spoke as if individual growth and social growth were the same
activity.312 Dewey believed individual freedom was bound up inextricably
with social progress and social development.
But might there come a point at which collective social action hindered
individual development rather than propelled it? This was a question Dewey
never conclusively answered. He remained committed until the end of his
life to wedding individual self-realization with government activism. 313 But
the mid-century struggle against first Nazi and then Soviet totalitarianism
directed the liberal theory he helped articulate into new channels. More
specifically, it forced democratic theorists to identify the bounds of
government authority and to articulate a theory of individual rights. Both
became urgent tasks in the face of authoritarianism. And liberal theorists
addressed both by returning to the ethic of authenticity.
305. See John Dewey, The Future of Liberalism, 32 J. PHIL. 225, 225-27 (1935) (describing
how "the laissez-faire doctrine- was held by the degenerate school of liberals to express the very
order of nature itself").
306. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 44.
307. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting John Dewey, Address at the Sunday Morning Service of the
University of Michigan Students' Christian Association (Mar. 27, 1892), reprinted in 4 JOHN
DEWEY, Christianity and Democracy, in THE EARLY WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 1882-1898, at 3, 5
(Jo Ann Boydston et al. eds., 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 435.
309. Id. at 435-36; Stuhr, supra note 216, at 94-95.
310. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 139-40 (explaining Dewey's views on the
connection between the development of individual personalities and societal institutions).
311. Id.
312. Id.; WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 433-34.
313. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 200-02, 206 (documenting how Dewey continued to




B. The Limits of the State
By the middle 1930s, Dewey's reconstructed liberalism had attracted
widespread support, but it was never without its detractors. A substantial
cadre of social scientists and political theorists sympathetic to moral
realism-the belief that some moral facts are true independent of social
context or circumstance-questioned Dewey's celebration of ethical
subjectivity.314 The outbreak of political absolutism in Europe crystallized
these theorists' misgivings and provided the occasion for a vigorous public
challenge. 1 5 The critics' contention was that Dewey's relativism could
supply no principled account of government's limits or individual rights.
316
Rather than abandon relativist premises, however, Dewey and his
sympathizers launched an aggressive counterargument: they contended that
relativism provided the only sure limits on state power.31 7  With this
argument, liberal theorists reaffirmed their commitment to relativism,
helping entrench it as the prevailing opinion of American intellectuals. 318 But
though it ratified, in this sense, Dewey's foundational claims, this defense
recalibrated Dewey's liberal theory in at least one significant way. It turned
his celebration of individual and social self-discovery into an account of the
state's limits instead of its possibilities. This was a change that would echo
in American constitutional law.
319
The critics' principal charge was that Dewey's ethical subjectivism
amounted to a doctrine of force: the Good was whatever the most powerful
said it was. 320 As Leonard Eslick of St. John's College put it at a meeting of
the American Catholic Philosophical Association in 1942: "The effect of
[Dewey's approach] is inevitably moral skepticism, and from this to
realpolitik and totalitarianism the distance is not very far." 321  Critics
contended that Dewey's liberalism actually undermined democracy by
denying individuals the only certain bulwark against political absolutism-
rights.322 Dewey spoke of individual growth as an ethical ideal, but he also
said that individual growth required collective action, that it was not
314. Id. at 180-96 (describing the challenges to Dewey's liberalism).
315. Id. at 137-38.
316. Id. at 179-81.
317. See id. at 160-62 (describing the relativists' rebuttal that realism encouraged
totalitarianism).
318. See id. at 200-05 (explaining the liberal consensus in favor of relativist thought and for
the idea that moral absolutism and political authoritarianism are linked).
319. See infra Part IV.
320. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 180 (citing critics comparing Dewey's philosophy to
totalitarianism).
321. Leonard Eslick, Current Conceptions of Truth, 18 PROC. AM. CATHOLIC PHIL. ASS'N 24,
29 (1942).
322. PURCELL, supra note 224, at 180 ("[Critics] charged Dewey with.., denying man's God-
given rights, and denying the true purpose of government as the protection of those rights.").
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meaningful outside a collective context.323 Worse, Dewey described growth
as amorphous, changeable, evolutionary. 324  It meant different things for
different societies in different contexts, and that meant it provided no firm
bar to government interference in the life of the individual. Armed with the
elastic duty to promote personal self-discovery, there was no telling what
government might do. 325 "The plain truth," said one critic, "is that, John
Dewey, more than any other single American writer, has undermined the
principles on which American democracy rests!, 326  The social scientist
Arnold Brecht summed up the antirelativist critique when he wrote in the
American Political Science Review that "[t]here can be little doubt that
totalitarianism has greatly profited from the value-emptiness which has been
the result of positivism and relativism in the social sciences. 327
For a time, the severity of these allegations appeared to disrupt the
consensus in favor of moral and epistemic relativism and posed, by
extension, a sharp challenge to Dewey's liberal project.328 Defenders of that
project and of relativism responded by converting the core relativist claims
into an account of government's limits.
Dewey himself launched the counterargument. He had been contending
since at least the 1920s that belief in moral absolutes was incompatible with
democracy. 329 Under fire in the late 1930s, Dewey deployed that claim
against his critics. As Dewey had it, moral realism was the philosophy that
harbored totalitarian impulses, not relativism. 33  Realism encouraged over-
confidence and disdain for opposing views. 33 1  It was rigid: it led to a
disinterest in social experimentation, personal growth, and ethical discovery
in favor of fixed boundaries for private and public, rights and duties.332
323. COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 367-68.
324. KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 140; Stuhr, supra note 216, at 93-95; see also
COPLESTON, supra note 220, at 367-74 (distinguishing between custom and growth and explaining
that "Dewey's answer is... that when a problematic situation arises, such as a clash between man's
developing needs on the one hand and existing social institutions on the other, impulse stimulates
thought and inquiry directed to transforming or reconstructing the social environment").
325. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 180-82 (describing critics' aversion to Dewey's
empowerment of government).
326. Stephen F. McNamee, Presidential Address, in PHASES OF AMERICAN CULTURE 7, 11
(1941).
327. Arnold Brecht, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 545, 545 (1941) (reviewing JACQUES MARITAIN,
SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS (1940)).
328. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 181-83 (noting that scholars began to criticize the value-
free approach of relativism).
329. Id. at 200-01; see also, e.g., DEWEY, supra note 216, at 30, 61-66 (discussing the role of
"contentious" learning and feudalism in efforts to establish a class system in society).
330. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 200-02 (noting Dewey's argument that moral realism
was linked to totalitarianism).
331. See id. at 201-02 (noting moral realism's tendency to embrace a single truth).
332. See JOHN DEWEY, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 89-102 (Capricorn Books 1963) (1939)
(recognizing that absolutist totalitarian regimes encourage freedom of discussion, criticism, and
voluntary associations much less than countries with suffrage and popular representation);
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Above all, moral realism sanctioned the dangerous belief that truth really
could be identified for all time and then made politically permanent. 333 In
this, moral realism fueled a dangerous sort of utopianism that invited political
coercion. 334 Political scientist John Lewis summarized this alleged affinity
between moral realism and absolutism: Commitment to moral absolutes, he
wrote, "invites the dangerous conclusion that since one right course exists,
since there is an absolute common good, an elite group, however small,...
is the best guardian of the welfare of the state."
335
Dewey's fellow travelers developed the corollary: Relativism bred
liberty. Relativism's critics, then, had it exactly wrong. Far from
endangering democratic freedom, relativism was the only certain way to
safeguard it because only relativism imposed dependable limits on the
state.336 Thomas Vernor Smith of the University of Chicago articulated the
relativists' line of thought when he claimed that belief in moral absolutes
stimulated "a push for power."337 Commitment to moral and intellectual
relativism, by contrast, disciplined this impulse by curbing the uses to which
power could be put.338 Drawing on Dewey as well as the positivism of Justice
Holmes, Smith argued that "civilization . . . lies somewhere beyond
conscience" and its truth claims. 339  Relativism taught that nothing was
certain and all ethical ideals contingent. 340 That meant majorities had no right
to impose their views as final. And it also meant that individuals deserved as
much freedom as possible to work out their own ends, according to their own
lights. "Democracy," Smith insisted, "does not require, orpermit, agreement
on fundamentals." 341 Majorities were of course welcome to believe what they
wanted about the Good, but any use of government power to force others to
accept their conclusions was illegitimate. 342 By circumscribing the appro-
priate uses of political authority, relativism guaranteed limited government,
PURCELL, supra note 224, at 201-02 (explaining the argument that relativism engenders freedom
of discussion, criticism, and voluntary associations).
333. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 202 (recognizing that the danger of political attachment
to one "right" course is inherent in absolutism).
334. See id. (suggesting absolutism can easily lead to one political group's supremacy).
335. John D. Lewis, The Elements of Democracy, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 467, 477 (1940).
336. See PURCELL, supra note 224, at 200-02 (discussing the advent and acceptance of a
theoretical contrast between "totalitarian and absolutist" Nazism and "nonabsolutist and relatively
free" American society).
337. T.V. SMITH, BEYOND CONSCIENCE 343 (1934).
338. Id. at 344 ("[U]nless the individualistic is common, ... unless the private is shared,
unless egoism is a good for others now, there never can be other good than power triumphant or
checkmated.").
339. See id. at vii, 334-35 (discussing the fungibility of truth, particularly in the context of
military victors).
340. PURCELL, supra note 224, at 204-05.
341. T.V. SMITH, DISCIPLINE FOR DEMOCRACY 124 (1942) (emphasis added).
342. PURCELL, supra note 224, at 209.
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individual freedom, equality, and mutual tolerance. 343  In the words of
Harvard philosopher Philipp Frank: "[T]his relativism has been for centuries
the only effective weapon in the struggle against any brand of
totalitarianism."
344
By the late 1940s, the relativists' counterargument had been widely
made and widely accepted in both the social scientific and legal
communities. 345 This outcome was hardly surprising, given the ascendance
of the relativist position before the late 1930s. But the new majority view
brought an important shift in emphasis. John Dewey linked relativism to
individual choice and self-development-this was the heart of his reformed
liberalism-but insisted that the aspiration to authentic growth licensed, even
required, robust government action.346 The gathering postwar consensus, by
contrast, retained Dewey's twin commitments to relativism and individual
self-development, but recast them as restraints on collective action. They
were the values that limited the state, not empowered it, and that prevented
oppression and absolutism. With this reformulation, the ethic of authenticity
was well on its way to becoming something for Dewey it had not been-an
account of individual rights-and a new apology for a concept central to the
police powers doctrine and the older understanding of liberty: the private
sphere.
C. Authenticity, Individual Rights, and the Private Sphere
Once liberal theorists began characterizing the contingent nature of
moral and ethical norms as a limit on government action, it was only a short
distance to thinking of the individual's capacity to define those norms for
herself as a right held against the state. In the aftermath of the Second World
War, liberal theorists made precisely that connection. Authentic self-
development, what Dewey had called "growth," was basic to human dignity
and thus foundational to any account of human rights, the argument ran. But
this step carried surprising implications. For authentic self-development to
be possible, liberal theorists reasoned, the individual required some space in
which to make the profound choices that defined her personhood. The right
to self-development turned out to require some sort of private sphere. The
ethic of authenticity thus led liberal theorists back to the private-public
distinction central to the police powers doctrine, but with a difference.
Liberal theorists now located this private sphere not in civil society but within
343. See id. at 215 (explaining one notable relativist scholar's perspective that relativist
democracy requires broad toleration of individual differences and compromise).
344. Philipp Frank, The Relativity of Truth and the Objectivity of Values, in SCIENCE
PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: THIRD SYMPOSIUM 12, 13 (1943) (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. PURCELL, supra note 224, at 209-10.
346. See WESTBROOK, supra note 222, at 433-39, 441 (noting Dewey's arguments for "the full
flowering of individuality" and for socialization of the American economy).
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the person herself. In the new liberalism, the private sphere had become
personal privacy.
Many scholars drew the connection between value relativism, authentic
self-development, and individual rights. In 1957, the constitutional theorist
Carl Friedrich suggested that the U.S. Constitution guaranteed "each member
of the Community a substantial amount of freedom... to search out the truth
for himself, to argue and to be wrong., 347 This was, Friedrich said, America's
great "moral belief."348  Writing at the same time, the popular poet and
essayist Archibald MacLeish defined freedom as the right to choose "the
truth which is true for [oneself]., 349  But one of the most influential
translations of relativism and authenticity into the argot of individual rights
came from the pen of the English &migr6 Isaiah Berlin. It was Berlin's
achievement to restate the Deweyian commitment to individual choice and
ethical self-discovery in the classic language of the Anglo-American liberal
tradition-that is, as a matter of negative freedom. 350
Berlin began from the now-familiar premise that belief in unchanging
moral facts paved the road to totalitarianism. 351 All the great despotisms of
the modem age, he said, had in common "a Platonic ideal," namely, that "all
genuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest being
necessarily errors. ' 352  But "[t]o force people into the neat uniforms
demanded by dogmatically believed-in schemes is almost always the road to
inhumanity. 35 3 So far Berlin and Dewey were in perfect agreement. But
Berlin's critical move came next: he identified the notion of moral universals
with the "idea of a perfect society', 354 and the two together with "positive
freedom." Moral realism, Berlin said, led straight on to the idea of liberty as
347. C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 12-13 (1957).
348. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted).
349. ARCHIBALD MACLEISH, FREEDOM IS THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN FUTURE, at viii (1951).
350. See JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN: AN INTERPRETATION OF HIS THOUGHT 50-59, 67 (2013)
(identifying Berlin's focus on negative liberty as allowing for self-creation). I am grateful to Ian
MacMullen for pointing out to me that philosophers and historians of philosophy mean different
things by "authenticity," and that some may worry at the association of Berlin with that term.
Philosophical debates aside, for the purposes of my argument in this Article, what I mean by
"authenticity" is nothing other than "a view of man as inherently unfinished and incomplete, as
essentially self-transforming . . . as at least partly the author of himself and not subject
comprehensively to any natural order." Id. at 45. That is precisely the view of the human person
that John Gray and others have identified as foundational to Berlin's political theory. See id. at 56-
59, 67, 176-79, 192-95 (chronicling the importance of self-creation to Berlin's theory).
351. For a thorough discussion of Berlin's "value-pluralism," see GRAY, supra note 350, at 74-
110.
352. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF HUMANITY 1, 5
(Henry Hardy ed., 1991).
353. Id. at 19.
354. ISAIAH BERLIN, The Decline of Utopian Ideas in the West, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY, supra note 352, at 20, 40.
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collective self-mastery, which turned out upon close examination to be
nothing other than liberty as submission. According to Berlin, moral realism
implied that there was "a common good, valid for all mankind"355-- or put
another way, "a harmonious solution of the problems of mankind"356-that
could be discovered by reason or perhaps revelation. There was in short a
single truth that held all of human life together. The individual achieved self-
mastery by identifying this truth and conforming himself to it.357 As Berlin
had it, that notion of self-mastery ended in submission because it implied that
those recalcitrant persons who failed to understand the true human telos could
be forced to conform to it for their own benefit and for the benefit of the
whole. 358 This amounted to a "monstrous impersonation, which consists in
equating what X would choose if he were something he is not, or at least not
yet, with what X actually seeks and chooses. '359
Dewey lauded collective self-mastery as potentially liberating to the
individual. 360  But Berlin claimed that authentic self-development and
positive freedom were mutually exclusive.361 Collective mastery stifled
authentic, personal discovery precisely because it assumed that there was one
"common good, valid for all mankind" to be realized.362 But there was not.
Dewey had not taken his own conclusions seriously enough. The world
contained not one but many goods, incommensurate with each other, among
which each individual must choose based on her unique understanding of
herself and her life ends. 363 "There are many things which men do have in
common," Berlin maintained, "but that is not what matters most. What
individuali[z]es them, makes them what they are, .... is what they do not have
in common with all the others. 364 Berlin traced this insight to Herder365 and
endorsed the grandly individualist ambition of the Romantic movement "to
achieve self-reali[z]ation and free self-expression against whatever odds. 366
Self-development could only ever be individual self-development.
Positive freedom, then, was a dangerous chimera. The aspiration to
authentic self-development required limits on the state and liberty for the
individual-"negative freedom" by which Berlin meant the capacity of
355. Id. at 43.
356. Id. at 44.
357. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131-34
(1969).
358. Id. at 133.
359. Id.
360. See KLOPPENBERG, supra note 122, at 139-40 (describing Dewey's views regarding the
relationship between self-realization, society, and attainment of the individual's capacities).
361. GRAY, supra note 350, at 58-59.
362. BERLIN, supra note 354, at 43.
363. GRAY, supra note 350, at 78-82.
364. BERLIN, supra note 354, at 39 (emphasis added).
365. Id. at 37-40.
366. Id. at 43.
[Vol. 93:275
Intellectual Origins
individuals "to choose to live as they may desire."367 That was the kind of
freedom that made self-development possible. And because it did, Berlin
saw negative liberty as "a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those
who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of
positive self-mastery. 368 Negative liberty honored the basic right of the
individual to choose her own ends. Berlin connected that right of choice to
human dignity.369  Leaving individuals free to arrive at their own
understandings of the Good honored their identity as "self-transforming
human beings., 370 For Berlin, the "freedom to choose ends",371 was the most
foundational of political rights-in fact the most foundational of all human
rights-and the only just basis for political society.3 72
Berlin's translation of authentic self-development into a species of
individual rights suggested a new definition of political liberty: liberty as the
right to authentic self-development, as the right to choose. This was an
ethical ideal, a metaethic in fact, that Berlin and other proponents believed
held universal significance for the just ordering of political society.373 But
importantly, it did not depend on any particular description of the Good or
system of natural law. Liberty as the right to self-development was grounded
rather on relativism, without need for other moral claims or absolutes.374 The
relativism that rejected the natural rights theories of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries turned out to support a rights theory of its own.
The turn toward rights was not the only parallel between the coalescing
idea of liberty as self-development and the older liberalism. The
redescription of self-development as negative freedom led scholars to
rediscover-and then reimagine-the distinction between private and public.
This reconstruction began in the early 1950s as a new genre of "public
sociology" merging social analysis, political philosophy, and legal theory
emphasized the vital importance of private space for authentic self-
development. One of the first and most influential entries in this field was
The Lonely Crowd, appearing in 1950 and written principally by legal-
scholar-turned-social-theorist David Riesman. 375 Riesman described healthy
individuality in terms directly taken over from the ethic of authenticity. True
367. BERLIN, supra note 357, at 170.
368. Id. at 171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
369. Id. at 172.
370. Id. at 171; see also GRAY, supra note 350, at 45-46, 50-51, 88-90 (explicating Berlin's
doctrine of value pluralism).
371. BERLIN, supra note 357, at 172.
372. See GRAY, supra note 350, at 177-79, 194-95 (noting that Berlin ascribes great
importance in human life to the freedom to make choices).
373. BERLIN, supra note 357, at 171-72.
374. GRAY, supra note 350, at 97-98.




individuality depended on "heightened self-consciousness," he said, on the
"success of [the person's] effort to recognize and respect his own feelings,
his own potentialities, his own limitations. 376 The hectic social world of
post-war America, however, worked against such self-realization by
relentlessly denying individuals the moral and psychic space necessary to
develop their inner capacities. 377 Increasingly dominated by a powerful mass
media and characterized by new, impersonal living arrangements like the
suburbs, American social life had become invasive.378 Lacking moral space
for self-development, the individual fell into conformism, with a resulting
loss of capacity to choose her own ends.379
Riesman's findings became a common refrain. Additional studies
published in the 1950s connected the development of authentic personhood
to the existence of some private sphere that would protect and nurture the
"core self. '380  As the sociologist Leontine Young explained: "Without
privacy there is no true individuality., 381 But it was not so much physical
space or seclusion these theorists lauded; it was a qualitative distance from
the demands and influences of others, including both society and
government.382 What individuals needed to develop their personalities was a
form of moral privacy for the inner self. Reflecting the intrinsic and
qualitative sense of this private space, social theorists sometimes spoke of it
not as privacy at all, but as autonomy.383 Autonomous individuals, Riesman
postulated, were those who had separated themselves from the mores of
society and risen above their social influences to become capable of true and
genuine choice.384
376. Id. at 305.
377. See id. at 295 (suggesting that individuals need "some freedom of behavior" to develop
autonomy).
378. See id. at 273-74 (commenting on the social significance of mass media).
379. See id. at 307-08 (asserting that American culture impedes the development of autonomy).
380. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 69-70
(1959) (discussing the individual's ability to build his own "social distance" from others); KURT
LEWIN, RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS 18-19 (1948) (stating Americans are "more willing to be
open to other individuals" on peripheral layers of personality than Germans, but that their inner
layers are just as guarded); Edward A. Shils, Social Inquiry and the Autonomy of the Individual, in
THE HUMAN MEANING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 114, 118-20 (Daniel Lemer ed., 1959)
(considering the "sacredness of individuality" and how individuals create and sustain a sphere of
privacy built from memories, intentions, and tastes; an involuntary sharing of the sphere of privacy
infringes upon one's autonomy).
381. LEONTINE YOUNG, LIFE AMONG THE GIANTS 130 (1966).
382. See RIESMAN, supra note 375, at 295 (asserting that most individuals "need the
opportunity for some freedom of behavior if they are to develop and confirm their autonomy of
character").




Riesman explicitly linked this privacy or autonomy with political
freedom. 385 Absent privacy, freedom was not possible. 386 "The idea that men
are created free and equal is both true and misleading," he concluded.
38 7
"[M]en are created different; they lose their social freedom and their
individual autonomy in seeking to become like each other."388 By the end of
the 1950s, some legal scholars had reached the same judgment. In a 1958
essay, Clinton Rossiter matter-of-factly referred to privacy as an element of
liberty, with privacy defined as a sort of moral independence. 389 "Privacy is
a special kind of independence, which can be understood as an attempt to
secure autonomy in at least a few personal and spiritual concerns, if necessary
in defiance of all the pressures of modem society," he wrote. 390 "The free
man is the private man, the man who still keeps some of his thoughts and
judgments entirely to himself," and who maintained, as a consequence, "an
unbreachable wall of dignity and reserve against the entire world.
391
And so the private-public distinction was central to liberty after all. But
the private sphere required by liberty defined as authentic self-development
was not a type of civil society free from government regulation, but rather
personal privacy, a moral independence, psychic space-autonomy. This
privacy was as necessary against social intrusion as it was against
government. The point was that privacy, like authenticity itself, was
something that inhered in the individual. It described the individual's needs,
if she was to be authentic, to choose her own ends; in a word, to be free.
The ethic of authenticity had enjoyed a long career in Western thought
before Dewey plucked it up in the early twentieth century. In his hands, it
became the nerve of a new understanding of liberty. By the early 1960s,
liberty defined as self-development-as the right to choose-was exerting a
profound influence on American thought, from the academy to popular
culture.392 Archibald MacLeish voiced its animating ethos when he claimed
it as the very essence of "the American Proposition., 393 "[I]f men, all men,
are free to make their own way by their own means to the truth which is true
for them, each one of them," MacLeish wrote, this "will be a better world:
385. Id. at 295-96.
386. Id. (noting that totalitarianism, which seeks to minimize freedom, "wages open and
effective war on autonomy").
387. Id. at 373.
388. Id.
389. Clinton Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN 15, 17 (Milton R. Konvitz & Clinton Rossiter eds., 1958).
390. Id. (emphasis omitted).
391. Id.
392. See, e.g., MACLEISH, supra note 349, at viii-ix ("[The American Proposition] is, indeed,
the one new and wholly revolutionary idea the world we call the modem world has produced.
393. Id. at viii.
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juster, stronger, wiser, more various.' ,3 94 That was liberty as authentic self-
development. And it was soon to fuel a major constitutional renovation.
IV. The Revival of Substantive Due Process
For nearly thirty years after it renounced the police powers doctrine in
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, the Supreme Court carefully confined its use of
the Due Process Clause to incorporating those portions of the Bill of Rights
it deemed fundamental.395 Then came, in swift succession, Griswold v.
Connecticut,396 Eisenstadt v. Baird,97 and Roe v. Wade.398 By 1973, the
Court had decoupled the fundamental rights analysis from the text of the Bill
of Rights, announced a constitutional right to privacy not enumerated in the
document, and prescribed strict scrutiny for statutes found to conflict with
this privacy right-all in the name of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court had revived substantive due process.
At the center of the revived doctrine was a new conception of liberty.
One could detect its influence as early as Griswold v. Connecticut in the
Court's sudden emphasis on the notion of privacy. 399 Eistenstadt and then
especially Roe clarified that this "privacy" interest stood for a complex of
ideas about the rights of the individual and the limits of governmental power
reaching far beyond the use of contraceptives by married couples. The issue
in fact was never contraceptives, it was always personal liberty. The story of
these cases and those that followed is the story of the Court refashioning its
due process jurisprudence to vindicate this ideal of liberty, an ideal that
became progressively more distinct and well-defined-if ever-broader-in
the progression from Griswold to Eisenstadt to Roe and ultimately to Planned
Parenthood v. Casey400 and Lawrence v. Texas.40 1
The background complex of ideas about the individual, rights, and
government that the Court began by calling "privacy '4 °2 and eventually
identified as a species of Due Process "liberty"4 3 will by now appear quite
familiar. It is the ideal of authentic self-development. Justice Brennan's
description of "privacy" in Eisenstadt as "the right ...to be free from
394. Id.
395. This middle way was forged by Justice Brennan, a methodology he called "selective
incorporation." See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV.
761,769 (1961) (explaining that the Court "opened [the] door" for incorporation of the Bill of Rights
through the Fourteenth Amendment). For the Supreme Court's own rehearsal of this history, see
McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 763-66 (2010).
396. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
397. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
398. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
399. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
400. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
401. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
402. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-86.
403. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
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unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters... fundamentally affecting
[the] person' 40 4 could have been penned by Isaiah Berlin or any number of
mid-century liberal theorists, perhaps even by John Dewey. And liberty
defined as Roe defined it, as the right of the individual to choose her own
ends, her own values, her own way of life, was liberty as authentic self-
development.
This revised conception of liberty unlocks the story of substantive due
process's revival. It explains why the Griswold Court seized on the ideal of
privacy, even as it propounded a definition of that term unknown to earlier
case law. It explains the theoretical connection between Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe, a problem that has puzzled scholars for years.40 5 And it
reveals the essential continuity of due process doctrine from Roe right
through Casey and Lawrence. Contrary to some who have found in
Lawrence a "constitutional revolution" that produced a new jurisprudence of
liberty,406 that case represented merely the logical outworking of the
constitutional revolution begun decades earlier with the idea of liberty as
authentic self-development.
This revised ideal of liberty also explains the Court's transformation of
the fundamental rights doctrine. Lacking a stand-alone definition of
liberty-one located beyond the text of the Bill of Rights-the fundamental
rights inquiry had for thirty years served principally as a vehicle for incor-
poration.407 The Court's discovery of liberty as self-development, however,
provided an independent measure of fundamentality, one outside the
404. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
405. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1537-46 (1994) (comparing the Court's holdings in Griswold and
Eisenstadt and asserting that Eisenstadt "signals a fundamental alteration in... society's view" of
the American family); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 926-37 (1973) (arguing that Griswold, but not Roe, is justifiable based on a right to
privacy derived from the enumerated privacy rights in the Constitution); Epstein, supra note 2, at
169-70 (arguing that Griswold has little application to abortion cases because there is no fetus to
consider in Griswold); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624,
674-76 (1980) (asserting that while Griswold is about sexual privacy, Eisenstadt is about "the status
of women" and "the freedom of intimate association beyond marriage"); Michael J. Sandel, Moral
Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 521, 526-28
(1989) (claiming that while traditional privacy was at stake in Griswold, it was not in Eisenstadt);
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1057, 1074-77 (1990) (arguing that Roe was not compelled by Griswold and Eisenstadt).
See generally JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1010-13 (8th ed.
2010) (noting the differences between protections for privacy in Eisenstadt and Griswold);
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 500-01 (18th ed. 2013)
(same).
406. Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21,21.
407. Individual Justices had from time to time called for expanding the fundamental rights
analysis to include unenumerated rights; for example, see Justice Douglas's dissent in Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and Justice Harlan's dissent in the same
case, id. at 541 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Constitution's text. By the time of Roe, the Court had deployed this new
criterion of fundamentality to refashion the fundamental rights analysis into
a doctrine of unenumerated rights.
In this Part, I analyze the arrival of modem substantive due process by
first rereading each of the cases constitutive to the doctrine's emergence-
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe v. Wade-in light of the ideal of liberty as
self-development. °8 I then trace the ideal's influence on the doctrine's
continuing development, including the Court's decisions in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas. What this careful reading
reveals is that from beginning to end, modem substantive due process
depends on the idea of liberty as authentic self-development.
A. Rereading Griswold
The Griswold case involved the prosecution of the director of a birth-
control clinic and an affiliated physician for dispensing contraceptives to
married couples in violation of Connecticut law.40 9 After finding that the
defendants had standing to raise the constitutional claims of the married
persons they advised, Justice William Douglas concluded for the Court that
the statute offended the Fourteenth Amendment4 °--though not, Douglas
insisted, because the Court intended "Lochner v. New York [to] be our
guide."n Douglas's strenuous disavowal of Lochner provides an important
clue to the Court's reasoning. Whatever else the Court was doing, it had no
intention of returning to the police powers jurisprudence that Lochner
symbolized. Instead, the majority saw its project in Griswold as something
altogether different. While Lochner-style jurisprudence meant (according to
the Court) "determin[ing] the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions, 41 2 the Griswold
Court believed itself to be protecting a qualitatively different interest: the
"intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect
of that relation., 413 The Court called this interest "Privacy"414 and declared
the use of judicial review to vindicate it not only constitutionally permissible
but constitutionally compelled.41 5
408. I begin with Griswold rather than Roe for the simple reason that it is not until Griswold
that the new approach to due process commanded a majority of the Court.
409. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
410. And presumably the Due Process Clause, though Justice Douglas did not say so directly.
Id. at 480-86.
411. Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 485-86.
415. We now know of course that Justice Douglas's earliest circulated draft of the Griswold
opinion relied not on "privacy" at all but rather on a right to "intimate association." BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 231-36 (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1985) (containing the draft of the Griswold opinion). But Justice Douglas appears not to have been
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Justice Douglas spent the balance of his opinion trying to explain why
this was so-what precisely this privacy was and why it held constitutional
416status. 6 A close reading reveals that the answers to those queries shared a
common rationale, rooted in the notion of liberty as self-development: The
Court was using "privacy" in a unique sense, to indicate a form of moral
autonomy that protected certain personal activities and decisions from
government oversight. And it regarded this privacy interest as constitutional
because it found it central to individual liberty.
The difficulty for the Court was that "privacy" was not a right
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Given the posture of its due process
jurisprudence since Parrish, that left the Court in a quandary: either deny
protection to the privacy right or recur to substantive due process, which the
Court associated with the police powers doctrine. The basic shape of the
Court's analysis can be explained by its efforts to escape from this
dilemma-to simultaneously extend constitutional protection to privacy and
to avoid any reliance on the police powers rubric.4 17 As Griswold's reasoning
demonstrated, that agenda-and more specifically, the Court's commitment
to the idea of privacy and the interests it stood for-would ultimately require
the Court to invent a different doctrine of unenumerated rights.
Not surprisingly given its renunciation of Lochner, the majority began
by invoking the language of incorporation.4 18 This is a point often missed,
but that is vital to understanding the Court's analysis. After suggesting that
protecting the "intimate relation of husband and wife" is a different business
from evaluating government regulation of economic and social conditions,
Douglas immediately noted that the Court had interpreted the specific
guarantees of the First Amendment to include certain ancillary rights: rights
critical to making the text's enumerated guarantees meaningful. 419 For
example, the Court had recognized the right to associate, to read, and-
reinterpreting the police powers cases Pierce v. Society of Sisters and Myers
v. Nebraska as First Amendment cases-to educate one's children and teach
a foreign language.420  "Without [these] peripheral rights," Douglas
explained, "the specific rights would be less secure.",42' This was logic rooted
in incorporation: ancillary interests could be constitutionally protected if
satisfied with that line of reasoning, and it did not win the assent of the Court. Following the advice
of Justice Brennan, Justice Douglas shifted the focus of the opinion to the right of privacy. Id. at
237-38.
416. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-86.
417. See WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 35, at 354 (attributing the
Court's reluctance to make substantive inquiries in the due process area to the constraints imposed
by Parrish).
418. Griswold, 381 U.S. at481-82.
419. Id. at 482.




sufficiently linked to textually enumerated rights. Douglas's argument was
that the right to privacy was like other ancillary interests the Court had
already recognized. Justice Douglas made this claim explicit a paragraph
later by pointing out that the Court had recently found the First Amendment
to imply "privacy in one's associations.1 22  "In other words, the First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion," Douglas reasoned.423 He claimed that the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments might similarly include ancillary rights to privacy.
424
But it was just here that the Court's innovative use of "privacy,"
sounding in the ideal of authentic self-development, became apparent.
American law had indeed recognized various privacy interests for decades,
including interests located in the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and
after Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren's seminal 1890 article, The Right to
Privacy,425 in tort law as well. But the privacy interests protected in these
areas of law were not what Griswold meant by privacy. To state the
difference succinctly: constitutional and tort law protected privacy interests
in seclusion and secrecy.426 Griswold protected autonomy.427
The Third Amendment prohibition on quartering soldiers42 8 is a
paradigmatic example of privacy as seclusion. The text protects the physical
privacy of home owners, or one might say, their peace and quiet
422. Id. at 483 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)); see
also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963) (affirming that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect certain forms of... group activity").
423. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
424. Id. at 484-85.
425. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 219
(1890).
426. Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup.
CT. REv. 173, 176-90.
427. Warren and Brandeis's 1890 article on privacy in tort law is sometimes identified as the
earliest statement of the modem due process right to privacy. The comparison misleads more than
it reveals. Warren and Brandeis treat privacy as a form of secrecy: they argue that tort law protects
certain personal information from public disclosure. "The common law secures to each individual
the right of determining, . . . to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be
communicated to others." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 425, at 198. To the extent it emphasized
privacy as secrecy, Warren and Brandeis's theory was of a piece with other privacy protections in
American law. What is more interesting is the pair's defense of privacy rules. Warren and Brandeis
call for enhanced secrecy protections in order to guard the "personality" of private citizens. Id. at
205-07. Their references to a right of "inviolate personality," and their claim that it is this right,
and not the right to private property, that best justifies tort privacy rules, does anticipate the modem
due process emphasis on selfhood as the ground of rights. Id. at 205. But the Warren-Brandeis
theory is not yet a theory of self-actualization; it lays no emphasis on self-development. Those
themes would be developed by other thinkers in the decades that followed, prompting a
corresponding change in the notion of privacy itself. See supra Part III.
428. U.S. CONST. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.").
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enjoyment.429 Fourth Amendment law to the time of Griswold similarly
focused on privacy as seclusion. Mapp v. Ohio,4 30 Kremen v. United
States,431 and Weeks v. United States, 432 to take three of the more prominent
Fourth Amendment cases at the time of Griswold, all emphasized the
citizen's right to be free from intrusions on his peace and quiet.433 In fact, it
may be the case, as Richard Posner has argued, that the importance early
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence attached to the defendant's ownership of
property reflected the Court's view that "the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment [was] simply to protect peace and quiet from the disruptive
consequences of police searches. 434  The famous Olmstead case,4 35
concerning wiretapping by federal officers,43 6 is consistent with this
emphasis. The Court's conclusion there that wiretapping did not violate the
Fourth Amendment turned on the lack of physical trespass on the defendant's
property, which meant the defendant's seclusion had not been disrupted.437
Fifth Amendment case law similarly protected an interest in seclusion
and also an interest in secrecy. The seminal case was Boyd v. United States43 8
from 1886; there the Court invalidated a federal customs statute providing
that an individual's failure to produce documentation sought by federal
officials would be deemed an admission of any allegations concerning its
contents.439 The Court found the statute in violation of both the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments. 440 As to the Fifth Amendment, the Court held that the
"forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers" contravened the Amendment's core guarantees.4 1 The
429. See generally Posner, supra note 426, at 174 (characterizing the invasion of physical
privacy as the "disruption of peace and quiet").
430. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
431. 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
432. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
433. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 646-47 (asserting that the doctrines of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments "apply to all invasions on the part of the government ... of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life" (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Kremen, 353 U.S. at 347 (describing the search of the cabin in which
defendants were found-and the seizure of its entire contents-as "beyond the sanction" of existing
Supreme Court jurisprudence); Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630)).
434. Posner, supra note 426, at 180.
435. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
436. Id. at 456-57.
437. Id. at 464-66; see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-12 (1961) (indicating
electronic eavesdropping device implanted in wall of defendant's premises trespassed on
defendant's property in violation of the Fourth Amendment). For a survey of the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence at the time of Griswold, see generally Alan F. Westin, Science, Privacy,
and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, Part H." Balancing the Conflicting Demands of
Privacy, Disclosure, and Surveillance, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1205, 1238-39 (1966).
438. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
439. Id. at 622, 638.
440. Id. at 634.
441. Id. at 630.
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physical seizure of the property was a constitutional violation (of seclusion),
but Boyd held that the disclosure of information the defendant sought to keep
confidential was also constitutionally problematic. This was privacy as
secrecy.442
As for the First Amendment, to the degree it protected "privacy"
interests at all, it protected them in the sense either of seclusion or secrecy.
By the time of Griswold, the Court had invoked "privacy" in First
Amendment cases as a description of the householder's interest in the quiet
enjoyment of her premises, including an interest in being free from the noise
of sound trucks443 and the intrusions of door-to-door salespersons. 444 It had
also recently defended the right of private associations to keep their
membership lists secret, perhaps an example of privacy as secrecy, though
the Court did not cast this series of cases as involving "privacy" rights.445
Tort law protections for privacy meanwhile also focused on protecting
secrecy-the "right of publicity" conferred on celebrities enforceable rights
in the advertising value of their name, while the "false light" tort prevented
disclosure of intimate personal facts about another when the newsworthiness
of those facts was outweighed by the harm publication would cause them.446
In short, constitutional as well as tort law recognized privacy interests
in seclusion and secrecy. Griswold invoked "privacy" to mean something
different. That difference came into focus with the Court's description of the
protected activity at issue in the case. The fatal feature of the Connecticut
statute, the Court emphasized, was its attempt to forbid "the use of
contraceptives" by married couples.447 That is, the right to carry on a certain
activity was the issue in Griswold, not the right to keep information secret or
even to enjoy the peace and quiet of one's property. True, Justice Douglas
did gesture toward privacy as seclusion by alluding to the geographic space
where the use of contraceptives would likely occur: the home. 448 But his
442. See id. (holding that the Constitution protects individuals from disclosure of incriminating
private information). By the time of Griswold, the Fifth Amendment had ceased to offer much in
the way of general protection for even the interests of seclusion and secrecy. In 1896, the Court
limited the privilege against self-incrimination to witnesses who feared criminal prosecution. See
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608-10 (1896); Westin, supra note 437, at 1238.
443. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949).
444. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 632-33 (1951).
445. See generally Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963)
(invalidating the conviction of an NAACP president for not divulging the list of members); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (protecting a private association's legal practices in the face of
intrusive state law); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (holding that a
law requiring out-of-state organizations to disclose its members was unconstitutional); Bates v. City
of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (reversing the convictions of defendants charged with violating
a law requiring organizations to disclose membership lists).
446. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 412-20 (1978)
(describing different privacy protections afforded in tort law).




reasoning only served to underscore that it was not privacy as seclusion he
was talking about after all. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms" to enforce the statute, Douglas asked
rhetorically. 449 But of course the law routinely permits searches of homes
and other invasions of seclusion if the underlying conduct is criminal.
Douglas's argument was that the conduct in Griswold-the use of
contraceptives-could not be made criminal because to do so would violate
the right to privacy. The privacy right in question then could not be the right
to seclusion in the home. Rather it was the right to freedom in the marital
relationship-freedom to make intimate decisions about one's sexual and
family life and to see those decisions through without interference by the
state. This was privacy conceived as a right of choice over matters that
touched the relationship of marriage, which the Court described as the most
intimate and meaningful of human relationships.45° In sum, the privacy the
Court had in mind was a sort of moral space for intimate decision making
and personal, marital fulfillment.
The ethic of authenticity and liberty as self-development explains the
Court's new conception of privacy. In keeping with that ethic, the majority's
opinion emphasized the freedom to make intimate and personal decisions,
decisions basic to one's identity and relationships, in terms of moral distance
from outside influence or coercion: this is what the majority meant by
"privacy." And the background notions of authenticity and self-development
explain why the language of privacy came naturally to the Court, despite the
innovative quality of its definition when read against prior case law.451
But precisely because the Court's conception of privacy departed so
markedly from the definitions the Court had used previously in reference to
the First, Third, Fourth, or Fifth Amendments, it was difficult to see how the
Griswold privacy right could be characterized as ancillary to the specific
guarantees of those texts, that is, as somehow necessary to make those
guarantees meaningful. And in fact Justice Douglas fairly quickly, if subtly,
abandoned the ancillary rights line of argumentation in favor of a different
contention: that the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and possibly Ninth
Amendments evinced a commitment to the ideal of privacy, an ideal standing
apart from any particular textual guarantee.452 This was the key language:
"The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of
449. Id.
450. Id. at 485-86.
451. Michael Sandel views the privacy right announced in Griswold as consistent "with
traditional notions of privacy going back to the turn of the century." Sandel, supra note 405, at 527.
Sandel places the critical intellectual break a bit later, beginning with Eisenstadt. Id. at 527-28.
But this misses Justice Douglas's reconceptualization of privacy, which the later cases merely
developed.
452. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
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privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. 453 This
was a new argument, not that the right to privacy was ancillary to any
particular amendment, but that it was implied by the ethos of all of them
together. That is to say, the right to privacy was a freestanding constitutional
right, an overarching norm generated by the suggestions and implications of
the text.
With that, Douglas abandoned the incorporation analysis that had
dominated the Court's due process jurisprudence since 1937. Instead,
Griswold announced a constitutional right independent of any specific Bill
of Rights provision. The substance of the right had to do with the freedom
to make personal choices central to the intimate relationship of marriage, an
idea deeply consonant with the ideal of authentic self-development. But
profound ambiguity remained. Beyond the right to select and use
contraception, the Court's new right to privacy remained undefined, and its
relationship to the Court's broader due process jurisprudence uncertain. If
Griswold did not use traditional incorporation analysis, neither did it recur to
the language of the police powers. The Court was innovating in service to an
ideal of personal freedom it found compelling. Eisenstadt and Roe pressed
that innovation forward, linking privacy to due process liberty and fashioning
a new doctrine of fundamental rights.
B. Rereading Eisenstadt and Roe
1. Eisenstadt v. Baird.-Eisenstadt v. Baird reached the Court seven
years after Griswold, in 1972. The defendant in the case, William Baird, was
convicted under Massachusetts law of distributing contraceptives to an
unmarried person.454 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan dismissed as
pretextual the state's asserted interests in preventing premarital sex and
protecting public health.455 The statute's true aim, he reasoned, was simply
to regulate contraceptive use.456 Whether or not that was a valid purpose the
Court claimed not to decide because-and this was the key holding-any law
permitting distribution of contraceptives to married but not unmarried
individuals violated the Equal Protection Clause.457
In one sense, this outcome was puzzling. Griswold's emphasis on the
marital relationship had directly suggested that differentiation between
married and unmarried persons was permissible. But now the Court held
otherwise, and with logic that clarified the substance of the emerging right to
privacy. "It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered
453. Id. at 485.
454. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972).
455. Id. at 447-52.
456. Id. at 452-53.
457. Id. at 454-55.
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in the marital relationship," Brennan acknowledged. 458 But, he went on, "the
marital couple is not an independent entity. 459 It was rather "an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup., 460 Then came the coup de grdce: "If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.",46' According to
Brennan and the Eisenstadt majority, the right to privacy was necessarily an
individual right because it protected the making of choices fundamental to
the individual's life interests. Eisenstadt thus recast Griswold's talk of
marriage and marital intimacy. That language, Eisenstadt maintained, served
merely to identify the (personal) choices at stake in that case as profoundly
important ones because they were connected to a relationship that defined the
individual's life. But it was not as if the marital relationship conferred on its
participants the right to make profound life choices. That right belonged ever
and always to the individual. Marriage was merely the setting for those
choices.
Critics have long charged that Eisenstadt's description of the right to
privacy as individual rather than corporate represents an unprincipled break
with the logic of Griswold.4 62 But the ideal of authentic self-development
suggests otherwise. That ideal taught that moral choice was ultimately a
project of self-discovery, and this project could be pursued only by
individuals. The person's ends and values were meaningful only if selected
by the individual according to her "measure.' 463 Both Griswold and
Eisenstadt are perfectly consistent with this logic. The choices in Griswold
concerned a relationship deeply significant to the life of the individual and
were for that reason weighty. It represented no break in the logic, only a
further articulation of it, to say that the decisions themselves could only
finally be made by the individual person. If privacy was a right of choice, it
could only belong to the individual who did the choosing.
Eisenstadt made the right to privacy a resolutely individual fight
centered on fundamental life decisions. As in Griswold, Eisenstadt portrayed
this "privacy" not as seclusion or as secrecy, but as freedom of moral choice
and self-development. In this respect, Eisenstadt brought the emerging
privacy right even more closely into alignment with the ideal of authentic
self-development.




462. Cf Epstein, supra note 2, at 169-70 (noting difficulties in reconciling the two cases).
463. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
2014]
Texas Law Review
2. Roe v. Wade.-By any measure, Roe v. Wade is a landmark case, not
least in this sense: It was here that substantive due process was fully and
finally reborn. Roe marked the arrival of the privacy interest as an account
of due process liberty and completed the development of a new doctrinal
framework to vindicate this liberty as privacy, liberty as self-development.
The question in Roe of course was the constitutionality of a Texas law
making it a crime to "procure an abortion., 46 4 The Court had appeared to
signal its view on that issue the year before in Eisenstadt when it held that
the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed individuals the right to decide
whether to "bear or beget a child., 465 Still, Roe involved an important factual
predicate not present in Eisenstadt-namely, the presence of prenatal life.
That factual difference might have rendered the individual-choice analysis of
Eisenstadt more difficult or even inapplicable, given that the choice at issue
in Roe touched not just the deciding individual but potentially a third party
as well. Strikingly, however, the Court turned the question of prenatal life
into a further defense of individual moral autonomy, revealing the true scope
and substance of the "privacy" right, which a majority of Justices were now
prepared to describe as a matter of individual liberty.
Justice Harry Blackmun's opinion for the Court included a lengthy
historical investigation of abortion laws from antiquity to the present as well
as a survey of medical and scholarly opinion circa 1972.466 But the
dispositive analysis centered on the question of prenatal life. Blackmun
acknowledged this question early on, noting in his second paragraph "the
sensitive and emotional nature of the abortion controversy. 467 Indeed, he
laid great stress on "the vigorous opposing views ... and... the deep and
seemingly absolute convictions that the subject inspires. '468 Blackmun's
point, however, was not merely that abortion was a delicate subject or
politically charged. His point was that abortion was the sort of
comprehensive moral question that implicated an individual's deepest
beliefs. One's view on the controversy concerning the fetus, Blackmun
wrote, involved "[o]ne's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to
the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes
toward life and family," and finally, "the moral standards one establishes and
seeks to observe. 469
In other words, the open question of the fetus's status made the abortion
issue not less a matter of personal privacy, but more of one. Here was the
crux of it according to Justice Blackmun and the Court: The judgment about
464. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
465. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
466. Roe, 410 U.S. at 129-47.





the fetus's personhood involved the woman's very "life and future"; 470 it
implicated her "[m]ental and physical health"; 47' and above all, it touched her
deepest moral convictions. "In view of all this," Blackmun concluded, "we
do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake. 472 The question of the fetus's
status was precisely the sort of morally freighted, identity-defining question
that the values of authenticity and autonomy demanded be settled by the
woman for herself. It was the capacity to address questions like these that
defined the woman's agency and her dignity. Reasonable people disagreed
on when the fetus became a person or what its rights should be,4 73 and that
was just the point. Such disagreement was irreducibly personal and moral in
character and therefore had to be left to the individual. "[The] right of
privacy,. . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy., 474
This reasoning further clarified the sort of privacy interest the Court
found so compelling. Roe made apparent in a way that even Griswold and
Eisenstadt had not that the right to privacy went well beyond seclusion or
secrecy. An abortion after all was not a private activity undertaken in the
quiet of one's home, but a medical procedure performed by physicians
already closely regulated by the state.475 The privacy of Roe, rather, was the
right to make one's own life decisions by one's own moral compass and then
see them through. It was a right to choice and to action in public in keeping
with that choice. Choice-over life-defining, morally fraught questions-
was the keynote. The Court expressly declined to locate the woman's right
to abortion in her bodily integrity. "[I]t is not clear to us," the Court wrote,
"that the . . . right to do with one's body as one pleases bears a close
relationship to the right of privacy., 476 Rather, the privacy of Roe concerned
personal choice on matters central to individual selfhood, just as the ethic of
authenticity would suggest.
As to the sphere of this privacy interest, the private place Roe protected
was not the home or a social space of some kind. The relevant private place
was the individual's inner sanctum of moral decision. The individual had a
right to make her choices there-within, by her own lights-and then to play
them out in public without state interference. While the issue in Roe involved
470. Id. at 153.
471. Id.
472. Id. at 162.
473. See id. at 116 (acknowledging the "vigorous opposing views" engendered by the "abortion
controversy").
474. Id. at 153.
475. See WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 35, at 396-97 (explaining that
Roe was "not a privacy case in the Griswold sense" because an abortion "was a semi-public act"
requiring a woman to visit a hospital).
476. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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family life, as Griswold and Eisenstadt had as well, the privacy right Roe
endorsed was not logically limited to family concerns. It was a right to
individual moral autonomy on all matters that touched the identity of the
individual-a right to choose and decide those matters for oneself.
477
And in Roe, for the first time, the Court was ready to describe this right
as a form of liberty. Roe inherited from Griswold and Eisenstadt the
uncertain status of what the Griswold opinion had called a freestanding
constitutional right to privacy.4 78 When he turned to consider the scope of
this right, Justice Blackmun dutifully rehearsed Griswold's reasoning that the
privacy right emerged from "the penumbras of the Bill of Rights., 479 But
Blackmun had no sooner rehearsed it than he abandoned it and turned to a
different analysis. The very decisions Griswold had cited as evidence of a
penumbral right Blackmun now argued "make it clear that only personal
rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. '480 This was the
test from Palko v. Connecticut, the test of fundamentality that the Court had
used for more than three decades for purposes of incorporation. 48' Blackmun
now claimed that the fundamental rights referenced in Palko included the
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy.4 82 The reason was that this
privacy right was central to liberty.
It was at this point that the Court's embrace of a new definition of due
process liberty began to have major doctrinal implications. By holding that
"[t]his right of privacy . .. [is] founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty,, 483 Blackmun and the majority reoriented the
fundamental rights analysis of Palko. As Blackmun had it, fundamentality
was no longer merely a judgment about the guarantees in the Bill of Rights,
it could include any truly weighty, compelling interest properly basic to due
process liberty. The right to privacy was thus something more than an
ancillary right, and it was something different from a freestanding, penumbral
constitutional interest. It was a right stemming directly from the Due Process
Clause's liberty guarantee.
In one way, Justice Blackmun's move was nothing new. Multiple
Justices had already argued that the fundamental rights Palko said the Due
477. See Sandel, supra note 405, at 528 (noting Roe expanded privacy to encompass certain
sorts of personal choices); Smith, supra note 6, at 190 (describing Justice Douglas's concurrence in
Roe as analogizing privacy with autonomy); J. Harvie Wilkinson III & G. Edward White,
Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 590 (1977) (discussing
Roe's expansion of the privacy-as-autonomy theory from Eisenstadt).
478. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965) (recognizing various
penumbral rights to privacy).
479. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
480. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
481. See supra Part 11.




Process Clause protected should not be limited to those inscribed in the
Constitution's text. Justice Douglas took this position in dissent in Poe v.
Ullman,4 84 as did Justice Harlan.48 5 Justices Harlan,486 Goldberg, Brennan,
and Chief Justice Warren had argued for unenumerated fundamental rights
in Griswold.4 87  But the idea had never garnered majority support. Roe
marked a turning of the tide. Liberty, the Court was now ready to say, meant
more than the rights listed in the Constitution. It had something to do with
"privacy," where privacy meant the ability to make one's own life decisions.
Blackmun's formulation of the Palko test in fact made it sound as if the
fundamental rights inquiry were about what rights were fundamental to
privacy rather than to liberty: "[O]nly personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' . . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy," he
wrote. 488  The phrasing was likely inadvertent, but telling nonetheless.
Liberty and privacy, where privacy was understood as moral self-
determination, belonged together for the majority.
By invoking Palko and fundamental rights but severing that analysis
from the constitutional text, Roe invented a new doctrinal framework. Going
forward, the way to determine whether an asserted interest was
constitutionally protected as a fundamental right under the Due Process
Clause was to ask whether it was essential to or implicit in the individual's
ability to realize her own ends, to make her own life choices, or as a later case
would put it, "to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. ' 48 9 Authentic self-development
had become the Court's vision of liberty.
As it reoriented the fundamental rights inquiry, Roe revived the judicial
surveillance of legislation once characteristic of the police powers era. The
right to privacy was part of "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of
personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, 4 90 Roe held. Those
restrictions were to be enforced by the Court. To carry them into effect, Roe
borrowed the tiers of scrutiny the Court had developed in its equal protection
jurisprudence and incorporated them into the law of due process. 49' Justice
Blackmun prescribed strict scrutiny for state action touching privacy interests
or other fundamental rights. "Where certain fundamental rights are
484. 367 U.S. 497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
485. Id. at 541-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
486. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500-02 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
487. Id. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
488. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citation omitted) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)).
489. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion).
490. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
491. The method ofbalancing state interests deemed restrictive to liberty by subjecting the state
interest to a particular level of "scrutiny" originated with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). See WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION, supra note 35, at 397 (explaining that the
balancing test "was borrowed from... Skinner v. Oklahoma" and applied in Roe v. Wade).
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involved, . . . regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
compelling state interest," he advised.492 The Court would resume its former
role as the arbiter of legislative reasonableness. But this time, reasonableness
meant not appropriate exercise of the police power but state action
appropriately respectful of individual autonomy and choice.
C. The Later Career ofAuthentic Self-Development
Roe embraced privacy as liberty-or perhaps more accurately, it made
clear that what Griswold and Eisenstadt had called privacy had really been
an idea of liberty all along.493 By supplying the liberty of the Due Process
Clause with substantive content drawn from the ethic of authenticity, Roe set
the trajectory of substantive due process into the future. Just as a
commitment to something like the ethic of authenticity animated the
Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roe trilogy, the same ideal would inspire the Court's
seminal substantive due process cases in the years to come. Indeed, the
Court's commitment to the ethic of authenticity would deepen rather than
diminish over time, with the Court's fullest expressions of the authenticity
ethic coming decades after Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey and
Lawrence v. Texas.
In Casey, decided in 1992, a three-Justice plurality explained the Court's
continuing commitment to the right to privacy in language drawn directly
from the idea of authentic self-development. "Our law affords constitutional
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," the
plurality instructed.494 The Justices emphasized that these decisions
necessarily belonged to the individual because of the morally freighted nature
of the issues involved. They were "the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy., 495 They were, that is to say, choices that defined the personhood
of those who made them. And so: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.,
496
Here were the major themes of the twentieth-century authenticity ethic
all in one place. Moral relativism, individual choice connected to personal
492. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kramer v. Union Free
Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
493. This is a point Randy Barnett and other proponents of the Lochner revival miss. See, e.g.,
Barnett, supra note 406, at 29-31 (analyzing the Court's choice to base its Griswold decision on
privacy rather than liberty); see also infra subpart V(A).





dignity, moral privacy, and the right to self-realization as a limit on state
action-Casey synthesized the prevailing intellectual trends of a century and
deployed that synthesis as a definition of liberty. Indeed, if the Casey
plurality made anything clear, it was that the Court was more deeply
committed to the equation of authentic self-development with liberty than it
was to the abortion right itself. The Casey plurality freely rewrote abortion
doctrine, abandoning the trimester framework and loosening restrictions on
state regulation of abortion rights.497 The plurality took its stand on the ethic
of authenticity.498
This commitment to liberty as authenticity reached its apotheosis eleven
years later in Lawrence v. Texas.499 The question before the Court was the
constitutionality of a Texas statute prohibiting same-sex sodomy. 500 The
Court invalidated the law as a violation of the right to personal choice and
self-realization. 01 "Liberty presumes an autonomy of [the] self that includes
freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct," the
Court reasoned. 0 2 Preventing homosexual couples from expressing their
mutual affection in a physical relationship denied them this "autonomy" and,
by extension, the capacity to define and enact their personhood. 3
Some have recently argued that Lawrence represented a decisive break
with the due process jurisprudence of the preceding decades and heralded a
new doctrine of liberty-based rights protection.50 4 On the contrary, Lawrence
was a seminal decision for the type of law it invalidated, but the reasoning
was not new at all. Rather, Lawrence merely embellished the notion of
liberty traced by the Court in Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe decades earlier.
If the opinion made any contribution to the intellectual development of due
process doctrine, it was to make clear that the right to privacy was entirely
subordinate to and dependent on the Court's larger understanding of liberty.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy invoked "liberty" no fewer than
twenty-five times; he mentioned the "right of privacy" exactly once.50 5 With
its defense of liberty as the animating ideal of substantive due process,
Lawrence aptly summarized thirty years of due process jurisprudence.
"Liberty," Justice Kennedy concluded, "protects the person from
497. Id. at 869-79.
498. Id. at 851; cf MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH
OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 92 (1996) (explaining the "voluntarist" assumptions at the base of the
Court's contemporary abortion jurisprudence).
499. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
500. Id. at 562-63.
501. Id. at 578-79.
502. Id. at 562.
503. Id. at 574.
504. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 406, at 33-37 (arguing that Justice Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence represented a "potentially revolutionary" departure from previous due process
jurisprudence which focused primarily on privacy and fundamental rights).
505. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-79.
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unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private
places"'5° 6-but not merely physical spaces. "Freedom extends beyond
spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of [the] self."50 7 This was the
crux of modem substantive due process.
In the years since, the Court has continued to invoke the authenticity
ideal to expand the rights of sexual autonomy, most recently in its decision
in United States v. Windsor 0 8 "Private, consensual sexual intimacy between
two adult persons of the same sex may not be punished by the State," Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Court, citing Lawrence, because such intimacy is
"[an] element in a personal bond" that is central to individual identity." 9 And
the authenticity ideal has inspired the expansion of substantive due process
beyond sexual privacy rights. In 1976, Justices Thurgood Marshall and
William Brennan contended that a New York county regulation limiting the
hair length of police officers was "inconsistent with the values of privacy,
self-identity, autonomy, and personal integrity" protected by the Due Process
Clause.51° In a very different context, a majority of the Court suggested in
Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health511 in 1990 that the due process
commitment to moral autonomy might guarantee individuals a right to
"refus[e] unwanted medical treatment." 512 Indeed, "autonomy" has become,
for many, shorthand for what the Constitution as a whole is about. Charles
Fried expressed today's prevailing consensus when he remarked in an essay
from the early 1990s that "[a]utonomy is the foundation of all basic
liberties.5 l3
But even as the Court's commitment to liberty as authentic self-
development spurred the expansion of substantive due process, it has
provoked an increasingly fierce critique, the basic elements of which were
traced by Justice Byron White in his 1986 dissent in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.514  White argued that the
"personal autonomy" endorsed by the Court in Roe could not be derived from
the Constitution's text or tradition.515 White's argument had two parts. First,
he maintained that none of the pre-Roe "privacy" cases endorsed a right to
privacy-as-personal-autonomy of the breadth suggested by Roe.5t 6 Second,
506. Id. at 562.
507. Id.
508. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
509. Id. at 2692 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567) (internal quotation marks omitted).
510. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
511. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
512. Id. at 278.
513. Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 225, 233 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
514. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
515. Id. at 790-91 (White, J., dissenting).
516. See id. (arguing that, while the definition of "fundamental liberties" is debatable, Roe
unquestionably went beyond a traditional understanding of the concept).
[Vol. 93:275
2014] Intellectual Origins 339
he contended that the privacy-autonomy right recognized in Roe could not
satisfy the test for fundamentality as set out in Palko.517 Contrary to Palko,
the Roe autonomy right was not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
518
nor, using the Court's restatement of Palko in Moore v. East Cleveland519 in
1977, "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition., 520 For Justice
White, the second factor was decisive. If the right was not enumerated or
clearly established in tradition or common law, it was not a fundamental
right.
Justice White's approach was taken up in subsequent years by the
dissenters in Casey521 and Lawrence522 and occasionally espoused in majority
opinions as well. After hinting in Cruzan that due process liberty included
the right to refuse medical treatment, the Court held in Washington v.
Glucksberg5 23 in 1997 that such a right lacked "any place in our Nation's
traditions" and on that ground, declined to count it as a liberty interest within
the meaning of due process.524 In 2010, the Court used the same approach to
the Second Amendment incorporation question in McDonald v. Chicago.
525
These oscillating fundamental rights tests have caused some confusion, not
least because the Justices who typically favor one approach have sometimes
joined the other approach without comment.526 What should be clear,
however, is that these competing tests represent a struggle over the ideal of
liberty as authentic self-development.
At the beginning of his opinion in Roe, Justice Blackmun invoked-and
lauded-Justice Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner.527 The citation proved
simultaneously ironic and fitting. It was ironic because while the Court in
Roe continued to reject the police powers jurisprudence, the version of
substantive due process it embraced in its stead cast the Court in almost
precisely the same role of legislative superintendent that it had occupied at
the zenith of the Lochner era. Like the police powers version of substantive
517. See id. at 791-93 (maintaining that choice in the matter of abortion is neither "deeply
rooted" nor "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," as evidenced by widely different convictions
over the issue (internal quotation marks omitted)).
518. Id. at 91-93 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
519. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
520. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 92-93 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503
(plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
521. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 952-53 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
522. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-88 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
523. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
524. Id. at 723.
525. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
526. See Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MIcH.
L. REv. 1517, 1522 (2008) (noting that Justice Kennedy, for one, has joined majority opinions
adopting different standards for identifying fundamental rights).
527. Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973).
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due process, the modem variant functioned as a doctrine of governmental
limits: It protected liberty by preventing certain types of government action.
More particularly, both doctrines prevented government interference with the
private sphere. But as we have seen, the modem doctrine understood the
private sphere in a new and different way-as internal, personal, and
connected to individual authenticity.
The reference to Holmes's condemnation of Lochner was fitting, on the
other hand, because the theory of liberty embraced by the modem version of
substantive due process was built on the relativism espoused by Holmes and
Dewey and their contemporaries. Liberty as authentic self-development
turned that relativism into a metanorm, an ethical principle, which in turn
became the animating idea of modem substantive due process. The end of
the police powers doctrine had been a beginning after all.
V. Rethinking Due Process: Implications
My purpose in this Article has been to analyze the emergence of modem
substantive due process by excavating the doctrine's intellectual sources and
mapping the ways in which those sources shaped, informed, and propelled
substantive due process's rebirth. I have offered, in short, a new account of
the modem doctrine's origins and development. This revised account
challenges some increasingly influential narratives about substantive due
process and its meaning, and in this final Part, I want to focus on two of them:
first, the libertarian-influenced school of Lochner revivalism and second,
Jack Balkin's theory of "living originalism."
As to the first, a number of scholars have lately contended that the
Lochner case anticipated various of the Court's twentieth-century rights-
protecting decisions, and for that reason, and for its liberty-protecting
character more generally, the Lochner doctrine is worthy of revival. 28 This
argument comes in different versions, but in all its iterations, it overlooks the
rise of the ethic of authenticity and the profound influence this idea exerted
on the development of due process doctrine. As a consequence, the story the
Lochner revivalists tell of Lochner's meaning, modem due process doctrine,
528. See, e.g., BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 214 (praising
Lochner as liberty-protecting); BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 124
(contending that Lochner's legacy "lives on" in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence);
Randy E. Barnett, Judicial Engagement Through the Lens of Lee Optical, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
845, 860 (2012) [hereinafter Barnett, Judicial Engagement] ("I would prefer that courts adopt a
'presumption of liberty' of the sort the Court seemed to employ in Lochner .. "); Barnett, supra
note 406, at 21 (referring to Lawrence as a "constitutional revolution" thanks to its focus on guarding
"liberty" rather than "fundamental rights"); Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, supra
note 9, at 493-94 (praising Lawrence for "implicitly reject[ing]" the idea of an unlimited police
power in favor of a renewed focus on liberty); Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 8,
at 60 (arguing that although Griswold, Roe, and other privacy cases can be traced to Lochner, the
Court's decision in Lawrence is "even more Lochnerian" than the others because the Court is now
concerned with protecting "liberty" rather than "privacy").
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and the relationship between the two is more than a little distorted. I do not
have the space here to develop a comprehensive critique of the revivalist
school, but I hope in this Part to point out the ways in which the analysis I
have developed offers a much-needed corrective to these Lochner
proponents.
Living originalism, on the other hand, is at once an account of how the
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence connects to the Constitution's text
and history and an interpretive theory of constitutional meaning. Here again,
space will not permit me to develop a full-scale argument, but I will suggest
the ways in which this Article's analysis casts appreciable doubt on the story
about the abortion cases' place in constitutional law that living originalism
tells.
A. Lochner Revivalism
Lochner revisionism has been in full flood for the better part of two
decades now.529 But some scholars have recently gone beyond revisionism
to argue for the affirmative worth of Lochner-era jurisprudence. Call them
the Lochner revivalists. The two principal exponents of the revivalist school
are David Bernstein and Randy Barnett, both libertarian scholars who make
somewhat different arguments for Lochner's revival. Bernstein claims that
Lochner represents a form of fundamental rights jurisprudence that
anticipated and quietly informed many of the Supreme Court's rights-
protecting decisions from the last century.530 Put simply, Bernstein sees deep
continuity between the Lochner era and the modern approach to fundamental
rights.531 Barnett, too, reads Lochner as rights-protecting but (correctly)
maintains that the police powers jurisprudence that informed Lochner's
reasoning came to an end in the late 1930s, 532 or at the latest possible date, in
1955 with Williamson v. Lee Optical.5 33 Barnett casts the period running
from the end of police powers due process until approximately Lawrence v.
Texas as an unfortunate interlude characterized by judicial disregard of the
liberty-protecting restrictions on government power he believes are written-
sort of-in the Constitution.5 34  Barnett argues that courts should recover
529. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 8, at 5-7.
530. Id. at 28; see supra note 8.
531. See Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 8, at 52-60 (discussing how
"Lochnerian fundamental rights analysis" continued to influence later due process jurisprudence).
532. Barnett, supra note 406, at 23-29 (describing cases from the time period that display this
shift).
533. 348 U.S. 483 (1955); see Barnett, supra note 406, at 845, 857-58 (identifying Lee Optical
as the terminal point for the police powers doctrine).
534. See Barnett, Judicial Engagement, supra note 528, at 860 ("The modern rational basis
approach ... represents a judicial abdication of its function to police the Constitution's limits on
legislative power."); Barnett, supra note 406, at 24-32 (providing a critical account of the rise and
fall of the "New Deal Constitutional revolution" through Lawrence); Barnett, The Proper Scope of
the Police Power, supra note 9, at 492-95 (hailing Lawrence as a return to form).
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these liberty protections-the "lost Constitution," he calls them-by
recovering police powers due process.535
Or more accurately, Barnett argues for recovering a version of the police
powers jurisprudence, a version critically shaped, as it turns out, by the ethic
of authentic self-development. And here we reach the critical similarity
between Barnett's theory and Bernstein's. For all their differences, the pro-
Lochner arguments made by both depend on the idea of liberty as authentic
self-development. Both scholars interpret Lochner and, in Barnett's case, the
police powers jurisprudence, in light of this notion of liberty, though neither
acknowledge or even appear to recognize the debt. And so in the end, it is
not so much Lochner they defend, but their own preferred iterations of the
ethic of authenticity.
1. Bernstein: Lochner as Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism.-
David Bernstein's central claim is that what he calls Lochnerian
jurisprudence-he has little or nothing to say about the police powers
framework generally-is a form of fundamental rights constitutionalism. 36
Bernstein maintains that the most persuasive interpretation of Lochner is that
the Court "was seeking to protect what it saw as fundamental individual
rights against excessive government intrusion., 537 According to him, the
Justices did this by "identifying rights they deemed fundamental to American
liberty, and decreeing that the Due Process Clause protect[ed] those rights
against the states. 538 The key analytic question, as he has it, was whether
the challenged state regulation trenched on an individual right that was truly
fundamental. The Court invoked due process only "when a violation of a
fundamental right such as liberty of contract was involved., 539 A right was
fundamental if it was a natural right "antecedent to government.', 540 The
Lochner-era Court never demanded, Bernstein says, that fundamental rights
be enumerated in the text of the Constitution.5 41 On the contrary: "[T]he
Supreme Court's Lochnerian jurisprudence [was] nurtured and sustained by
535. Barnett, Judicial Engagement, supra note 528, at 860; see also BARNETT, RESTORING THE
LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 267 (arguing for a return to heightened scrutiny for
government restrictions on "liberty").
536. See generally Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 8 (claiming that
fundamental rights jurisprudence can trace its origins to Lochnerian due process decisions).
537. Id. at 31.
538. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 110.
539. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, supra note 8, at 30.
540. Id. at 37.
541. Id. at 31-35.
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a belief that it was the judiciary's role to protect unenumerated fundamental
constitutional rights from government invasion. 542
On Bernstein's retelling, Lochner comes to look much like the Court's
fundamental rights cases following Griswold-in other words, Lochner
comes to look much like modem substantive due process. And that is exactly
the point. Bernstein insists that though the Court noisily abandoned review
of economic regulations under the Due Process Clause in the late 1930s, it
continued to use Lochner's methodology to enforce other fundamental rights
against the states, first through the incorporation doctrine and then, from the
middle 1960s onward, by protecting nontextual rights deemed central to
personal autonomy. 543 Indeed, Bernstein reads Griswold as a profoundly
Lochnerian case insofar as it rested on the "notion that the individual rights
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are primarily found in the Due
Process Clause's protection of fundamental unenumerated rights," an idea he
attributes to Lochner.5" In fact, to the extent Lochner stands for the
protection of unenumerated individual rights, Bernstein argues that the
Lochner-era cases are the "true progenitors, 545 of the "modem Supreme
Court's broad protection of civil liberties and civil rights, 546 including the
"right to terminate pregnancy and to engage in private consensual sex." 547 At
the end of the day, the modem Court is doing nothing other than what the
Lochner Court did: protecting rights it deems fundamental. 48
This account of the relationship between the Lochner era and modem
substantive due process is confused. To begin with, Bernstein fundamentally
mistakes the character of the Lochner-era police powers jurisprudence. As
we have seen, that jurisprudence focused not on protecting particular
individual rights, fundamental or otherwise, but on protecting a private
sphere of liberty from government intrusion.549 The rights themselves-
whether the right to contract or to labor or to own and sell property--did
virtually no analytic work in the police powers framework. Rather, the
doctrine's central concern was to limit the exercises of governmental power
in and over the private sphere by limiting government to those regulations
reasonably necessary to protect the public good.550 The doctrine defined
"necessary to the public good" as regulations benefitting the public as a
whole and directly connected to the health, safety, or morals of the
542. Id. at 51.
543. Id. at 52-53.
544. Id. at 55.
545. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 116.
546. Id. at 123.
547. Id. at 116.
548. Id. at 110.
549. See supra Part I.
550. See supra subpart I(A).
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populace.5 1 The aim, again, was to protect the social sphere where citizens
exercised their most important rights-it was this sphere, not particular
rights, the doctrine guarded.
Bernstein misses all of this, in part because he is anxious to discount the
critique lodged by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and other progressive
detractors of the police powers doctrine. Bernstein derides Holmes's
Lochner dissent as decidedly idiosyncratic and analytically unserious; it
failed to engage or otherwise meaningfully respond to, he claims, the
widespread consensus that the Constitution protected unenumerated
individual rights.552
Bernstein has got Holmes wrong.553 Holmes did not argue against the
consensus for constitutional protection of"fundamental" rights because there
was no such consensus. He argued against judicial scrutiny of legislation for
reasonableness.554 More broadly, he argued against the central premises of
the police powers doctrine: natural rights, the inviolability of property, and
the distinction between the public and private spheres. And his critique,
though indeed a minority position at the time of Lochner, eventually carried
the day. In due course most members of the Court came to share Justice
Holmes's skepticism of the police powers doctrine and its major premises,
leading them, in the end, to reject the entire enterprise of attempting to
confine the government to reasonable exercises of its police authority.555
Having failed to acknowledge this decisive break, at once doctrinal and,
more critically, intellectual, Bernstein fails to see the profound reimagining
of liberty the Holmesian critique helped set off. The union of liberalism and
authenticity, the valorization of personal choice, the redefinition of the
private sphere: Bernstein screens all this out. Consequently, he does not
recognize that contemporary fundamental rights jurisprudence bears a
distinctly different shape than its police powers forbearer, a shape given it by
the intellectual revolution of the first half of the twentieth century. And he is
left arguing for a connection between substantive due process old and new
that the cases simply will not bear. Though Bernstein claims that the
Supreme Court's contemporary civil liberties doctrine can be traced to
"Lochnerian due process decisions such as Adkins v. Children's Hospital
(1923), Buchanan v. Warley (1917), Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), Pierce v.
551. See supra subpart I(A).
552. See BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 36-37 (describing Justice
Holmes's dissent and his "hostility to individual rights"); Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism,
supra note 8, at 37-38 (claiming there was a "virtual consensus" on the Court regarding the
protection of fundamental rights).
553. Bernstein is following Howard Gillman here, who similarly and mistakenly discounts
Justice Holmes. See GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 131 (arguing that Justice Holmes's dissent ignored
constitutional tradition).
554. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
555. See supra subpart I(B).
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Society of Sisters (1925), and Gitlow v. New York (1925),1556 all those cases
but one turned on the reasonableness of the relevant state's police power
regulations. The outlier was Gitlow, the lone decision treating the substance
of an individual right-free speech, in that case-but it was decided outside
the Lochner police powers framework on a theory of incorporation. 57
Gitlow, in other words, is not a Lochner case at all.558
Ultimately, the fundamental rights jurisprudence Bernstein defends is
not Lochner or the police powers doctrine. It is a decidedly modem iteration
of substantive due process, premised on the decidedly modem notion of
liberty as authentic self-development.
2. Barnett: The Lost Constitution.-Randy Barnett makes a different
argument for reviving Lochner, though the version of Lochner he wants to
revive turns out to be as thoroughly anachronistic as Bemstein's. Unlike
Bernstein, Barnett realizes that the police powers doctrine protected not
specific rights, but a private sphere of rights and liberty.559  He also
recognizes, again in contrast to Bernstein, that the Court rejected this
doctrinal formula in the middle twentieth century.560 Barnett considers this
rejection a lamentable act of constitutional infidelity because restrictions on
the police power, he believes, are embedded in the Constitution.56! More
exactly, he claims the Constitution protects unenumerated natural rights-
not simply those listed in the document-by requiring the government to
demonstrate that any incursion on personal liberty is reasonable: necessary
for the health or safety of the public or to protect the rights of third parties.
562
This requirement that government justify as reasonable any regulation
trenching on the private sphere is part of what Barnett calls the "lost
Constitution," lost when the Supreme Court abandoned the police powers
jurisprudence.563
But there is a strange quality about Barnett's lost Constitution. The
sphere of liberty it supposedly protects sounds remarkably like the liberty of
556. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER, supra note 8, at 123.
557. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
558. See WHITE, JUSTICE HOLMES, supra note 35, at 441-42 (noting that Justice Holmes saw
"liberty of contract" and "liberty of speech" as different rights requiring differing forms of analysis,
as reflected in Justice Holmes's Gitlow dissent).
559. See BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 213-14 (noting that
the Lochner doctrine deals broadly with the "liberty of the individual").
560. Id. at 228-29; Barnett, supra note 406, at 24-27. Barnett has recently speculated that
perhaps the final break came with Lee Optical in 1955. See supra note 533 and accompanying text.
561. Barnett reads them in the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and
perhaps even the Due Process Clause. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra
note 9, at 205-08, 234-42.
562. Id. at 235, 238.
563. See id. 354-57 (criticizing modem due process doctrine as unfaithful to the Constitution's
liberty-protecting provisions and purposes).
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authentic self-development. Barnett reads provisions like the Ninth
Amendment and Privileges or Immunities Clause and perhaps even the Due
Process Clause to protect "abstract natural rights" that, he says, "define a
boundary or jurisdictional space"-and here is the key language-"within
which people should be free to make their own choices."564 This is Bamett's
version of the police powers doctrine. The Constitution protects
unenumerated natural rights by guaranteeing a private sphere of liberty that
is above all a "moral space," Barnett claims, "within which persons must be
free to make their own choices and live their own lives if they are to pursue
happiness while living in society with others. 565 And again: "[N]atural
liberty rights define a sphere of moral jurisdiction that persons have over
certain resources in the world-including their bodies. This jurisdiction
establishes boundaries within which persons are free to do as they wish. 566
In short, the sphere of liberty Barnett believes the lost Constitution
vouchsafes is a sphere defined by the right to autonomy and authentic self-
development.
Whatever else can be said for this conception of liberty, it is not one
rooted in the nineteenth-century police powers jurisprudence. Instead,
Barnett has reformulated that doctrine in light of the modem notion of liberty
as authentic self-development. Barnett's discomfort with the actual police
powers doctrine can be glimpsed in his dismissal of morals legislation. He
acknowledges that the police power was typically understood to permit states
to protect "not only the 'health and safety' of the general public, but its
'morals' as well," '56 7 and that on this rationale, states adopted laws banning
gambling, alcohol consumption, prostitution, and other types of activities that
imposed no direct third-party harm.568 But Barnett objects to these exercises
of the police power as unreasonable on the ground that they limit "purely
private activity,"5 69 including what one does with one's body.570 As he has
it, the Constitution forbids the state from adopting regulations of this sort
because what the Constitution ultimately prohibits is intrusion on "the moral
space within which persons [are] free to make their own choices. 57'
Consensual, private acts that do not directly harm third parties belong to that
"moral space., 572 The moral choices these acts involve are basic to individual
564. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
565. Id. at 80.
566. Id. at 258.
567. Id. at 329.
568. Id.
569. Id. at 331.
570. Id. at 258.
571. Id. at 80. The other reason Barnett gives is that judgments about morality cannot be
reviewed for their rationality. Id. at 33 1. This argument too reflects a modernist mindset-in this
case, a modem skepticism of moral value not shared by the nineteenth-century advocates of the
police powers doctrine.
572. Id. at 80.
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dignity; they are the means by which people "live their own lives., 573 The
nineteenth-century practitioners of the police powers doctrine, Barnett
concludes, simply did not recognize this fact.
574
But then that is because the nineteenth-century notion of liberty was
noticeably different from the one Barnett propounds. Barnett's emphasis on
personal choice and moral freedom are modem preoccupations, not
nineteenth-century ones. His effort to revive the police powers doctrine thus
amounts, in the end, to a proposal to expand the ethic of authenticity to
include not just sexual and reproductive rights but also the right to contract,
to engage in commerce, to consume controlled substances575-to do
anything, in sum, that does not impose direct third-party harm.576 In this
respect, Barnett is more radical than Bernstein. He would abandon the
contemporary fundamental rights jurisprudence altogether and return to a
rule requiring the government, state or federal, to justify any and all of its
actions as "reasonable," where reasonable means necessary to the public
health or safety.577 Barnett wants the courts to go back to protecting a private
sphere of liberty, but liberty understood now as authentic self-development.
Barnett's anachronistic interpretation of liberty and the police powers is
abetted by his blinkered reading of the development of modem substantive
due process. He claims that the Court's positivist turn to fundamental rights
reflected in Carolene Products footnote four "foreshadows the entire post-
New Deal theory of judicial review and constitutional rights." '578 But this
assessment is misleading at best: it misses the truly big story, the intellectual
watershed that redefined liberty and spurred the major doctrinal innovations
of the 1960s. The Court has indeed focused more or less consistently on
fundamental rights in the decades since the police powers' demise, but what
it understands as "fundamental" has changed markedly, following its
changed understanding of liberty.579 Barnett ignores this seminal shift and is
left struggling to explain how Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, and the
573. Id.
574. See id. at 328-29 (arguing that judges construed the police power too broadly); see also
Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 Nw. U. L.
REv. 615, 656-58 (2009) (voicing skepticism of government regulation of "purely private
morality").
575. See Barnett, supra note 406, at 41 (suggesting that proponents ofmedicinal cannabis ought
to benefit from a presumption of liberty).
576. Id.; see also BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 9, at 333-34
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to show that an exercise of the police power
either protects individual rights or regulates liberty in a way that protects third-party rights).
577. See Barnett, supra note 406, at 41 (explaining that a robust "presumption of liberty" would
allow the courts to protect a larger set rights).
578. Id. at 27.
579. See supra Part IV.
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unenumerated rights cases that followed fit into the positivist jurisprudence
of footnote four. He eventually admits they hardly fit at all.58°
Though they make different arguments, Bernstein and Barnett share a
common shortcoming. They do not appreciate the origins and development
of modem substantive due process. Consequently, they do not realize the
extent to which they are the modem doctrine's intellectual debtors. Lochner
may or may not be worthy of revival, but these contemporary advocates have
in fact been making the case for something else: for a revised version of
liberty as authentic self-development.
B. Living Originalism
Jack Balkin tells a different story about the fit between the Court's
recent rights jurisprudence and the Constitution.581 He offers an explanation
of Roe and the Court's line of abortion cases that purports to connect that
jurisprudence to the Fourteenth Amendment's original meaning. As to what
counts as original meaning, Balkin offers a theory he calls "living
originalism. '5 82  The intellectual history developed here suggests that
Balkin's explanation of the abortion jurisprudence is at best myopic. Balkin
claims to explain Roe based on the original meaning of equal protection, but
his argument turns critically on more recent ideas-on freedom of choice and
authenticity. 583 In a word, Balkin is deeply indebted to the ideal of authentic
self-development. Balkin's insistence that this ideal can be called "original"
to the Fourteenth Amendment exposes how anachronistic his thesis truly is.
Consider Balkin's explanation of the Court's abortion jurisprudence.
According to him, Roe is best understood as an application of the Equal
Protection Clause. 584 This of course is a different rationale from the one the
Court has offered, but it is the one, Balkin thinks, that actually connects the
result in Roe with the text of the Constitution. 585 The main thrust of Balkin's
argument is that prohibiting a woman from obtaining an abortion is to force
her into the role of mother, a role that carries profound personal and economic
burdens as well as weighty social expectations.586 To press a woman into this
role is to "subordinate" her, Balkin says, in violation of the Equal Protection
580. See Barnett, supra note 406, at 29-31 ("Nevertheless, 'emanations' and 'penumbras' could
not conceal the fact that the protection of an unenumerated right of privacy was outside the
framework of Footnote Four.").
581. See generally BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 14; Balkin, Abortion and
Original Meaning, supra note 14.
582. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 14, at 3-6, 21-23.
583. See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 323-25 (claiming that anti-
abortion laws deny women a significant choice in the direction of their lives and control over their
bodies).
584. Id. at 319-28.
585. Id. at 325-27; accord BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 14, at 214-15.
586. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 323-24.
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Clause's (or alternatively, the Privileges or Immunities Clause's) rule against
caste legislation. 87
But Balkin's antisubordination argument has a curious feature. He is
not arguing that motherhood is degrading per se. Motherhood is not, in this
sense, like chattel slavery or the inferior social roles assigned African-
Americans and other racial minorities in American history. His argument,
rather, is that motherhood is degrading if not freely chosen. "It is one thing
if women freely choose to become mothers, assume the physical burdens and
risks of pregnancy and childbirth, and take on the various social roles and
expectations of motherhood in our society," Balkin explains. 588 "It is quite
another when the state forces them against their will ... When the state
denies women a free choice, "it denies them their liberty in the most profound
way. '590 Balkin's argument against subordination turns out to be an
argument based on liberty, where liberty is understood as personal choice and
autonomy. In short, it is an argument from the ideal of authentic self-
development. Which means that though Balkin claims to offer a different
rationale from the one adopted by the Court in its due process jurisprudence,
he in fact works from the same controlling ethic.
This is not to say that Balkin's argument from choice and authenticity
is wrong; only that, in the end, it relies on an understanding of liberty and not
merely equal protection. And this understanding of liberty is distinctly native
to the twentieth century. Still, Balkin insists his argument is originalist,59
which betrays something important about Balkin's brand of originalism: it
depends on a dehistoricized reading of constitutional principles. But if the
foregoing analysis reveals anything, it is that concepts and principles-like
"liberty"-are as historically conditioned as any other piece of language.
That is to say, the choice is always between one historically situated
understanding of a principle and another. There is no such thing as a
universal concept that lives beyond history.592 To prefer liberty as self-
development, for instance (as Balkin does), to the notion of liberty at back of
the police powers doctrine is to prefer a thoroughly modem definition of the
principle of liberty. It is not to apply some abstract, universal principle of
liberty to new historical circumstances. It is no good telling an advocate of
the police powers doctrine that you agree with her concept of liberty but
587. Id. at 320-24.
588. Id. at 324.
589. Id.
590. Id. (emphasis added).
591. E.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 449 (2007).
592. I take this point to be one of the central contributions of Quentin Skinner's important work.
See, e.g., Skinner, Meaning and Understanding, supra note 5, at 52-53 (describing how studying
the history of ideas illuminates that "truths may in fact be the merest contingencies of our particular
history and social structure" (footnote omitted)).
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simply want to apply it in a different way. In fact, advocates of modem
substantive due process advance a markedly different concept altogether.593
In other words, one can privilege the original, historical meaning of a
principle or not, but privileging the original meaning means privileging the
historically situated meaning. If one is not willing to privilege the meaning
of the principle as understood at the time, in its historical particularity, one is
not willing to be an originalist.
But really, Balkin's explanation of the Court's abortion jurisprudence is
less committed to originalism than to authentic self-development. Balkin
notes that his defense of Roe is one he has learned from other theorists.594
That in itself is telling. Like Balkin, many or even most defenders of the
Court's due process doctrine embrace the ideal of authentic self-
development. Yet they rarely argue for it. This is as true for the critics of
due process as it is for detractors, and of course for revisionists like David
Bernstein and Randy Barnett as well. Most participants on all sides in the
current debate over due process simply do not recognize the intellectual
foundations of the doctrine they are disputing or their dependence on those
same foundations. The debate has been impoverished and sometimes simply
beside the point as a result. It is time to set the story straight.
Conclusion
The intellectual history of modem substantive due process is a
fascinating tale, and more importantly, it is a useful one. When we
understand its intellectual origins, we see substantive due process in fresh
perspective. Modem substantive due process is something different and
more than the sterile debating positions of the last forty years have usually
allowed. It is an attempt to answer the enduring challenge of imposing limits
on popular government. It is an effort to define and protect individual rights.
Above all, it is an interpretation of liberty. That this interpretation has
become powerfully pervasive is by now, I trust, fully apparent. Whether it is
worthwhile, or for that matter legitimate as a matter of constitutional
interpretation, are entirely different questions. With any luck, this Article
will help make answering those vital queries possible.
593. See, e.g., Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 14, at 319-28 (outlining his
theory of equal citizenship).
594. Id. at 292 & n.3.
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